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NARRATIVE CAPACITY*
JAMES TOOMEY**
The doctrine of capacity is a fundamental threshold to private law. The law
only recognizes private decision-making—from buying or bequeathing property
and entering into employment contracts to getting married or divorced—made
with the level of cognitive functioning that the capacity doctrine demands. When
the doctrine goes wrong, it denies individuals, particularly older adults, access
to basic private-law rights on the one hand, and ratifies decision-making that is
nothing but the result of dementia or mental illness on the other.
The capacity doctrine in private law is built on a fundamental philosophical
mismatch. It is grounded in a cognitive theory of personhood, and determines
whether to recognize private decisions based on the cognitive abilities thought by
philosophers to entitle persons in general to unique moral status. But to align
with the purposes of the substantive doctrines of property and contract, privatelaw capacity should instead be grounded in a narrative theory of personal
identity. Rather than asking whether a decision maker is a person by measuring
their cognitive abilities, the doctrine should ask whether they are the same person
by looking to the story of their life.
This Article argues for a new doctrine of capacity under which the law would
recognize personal decision-making if and only if it is linked by a coherent
narrative structure to the story of the decision maker’s life. Moreover, the Article
offers a test for determining which decisions meet this criterion and explains how
the doctrine would work in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
An older woman is in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. She’s
forgetful and often confused. Sometimes she does things that seem out of
character. For a while, she’s alright. She remembers who she is and where she
came from. But she’s starting to need help. Alone and frightened, she calls her
estranged and only son—like she promised, decades before, she never would.
After overcoming hesitation, the son offers to take her in. Years go by, her
cognitive abilities decline, mother and son reconcile. They forgive—slowly,
over time. Toward the end, the woman wants to change her will to acknowledge
this reconciliation. She has a vague sense this is important, but she doesn’t quite
understand why, or how much she has to give. She should be permitted to make
this change. Under our law, she would not be.1
Mental capacity—understood as a measure of cognitive functioning—
permeates American law. Cognitive measurements tell us everything from
whom we may execute2 to whom we may excuse from the procedural
requirements of tort law.3 In the private-law doctrines of property and
contract—and related doctrines that recognize personal decision-making,
including trusts and estates and family law4—mental capacity operates as a
1. See, e.g., Wiesman v. Wiesman, No. 2017AP446, 2018 WL 4943805, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished table decision) (declining to recognize a change to a longstanding estate
plan where elderly decision makers, who suffered from moderate dementia, were deemed not to have
a full understanding of their assets at the time of the change); In re Estate of Flowers, 88 N.E.3d 599,
619 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (same); In re Estate of Lynch, 350 S.W.3d 130, 137 (Tex. App. 2011) (same).
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of the mentally incapacitated).
3. See Mount v. City of Vermillion, 250 N.W.2d 686, 688 (S.D. 1977) (noting that filing
deadlines are tolled by mental incapacity).
4. Capacity litigation most frequently arises in intimate private-law decision-making—trusts and
estates, donative transfers, personal sales, housing decisions, and family law decisions. See infra notes
36–60 and accompanying text. Capacity challenges arise from time to time in commercial contexts
involving closely-held companies, see, e.g., United Bank v. Buckingham, No. 363481V, 2018 WL
2175806, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 10, 2018) (involving the capacity of the principal of a familyrun business), but do not arise in situations involving legal persons that do not have a “mental capacity”
at all, for example, corporations.
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threshold to the protections of law.5 If you have the cognitive abilities
demanded by the law, you may make any decision you want; if you do not, your
decisions will not be acknowledged by the legal system.6
Capacity litigation is pervasive in the state courts.7 These cases most
frequently involve older people, especially those with dementia—gradual,
chronic cognitive decline.8 But capacity is implicated by any mental illness
affecting cognition9 even in cases involving temporary intoxication with alcohol
or other drugs.10 For instance, determinations of mental capacity kept American
singer-songwriter Britney Spears in a restrictive conservatorship for the better
part of her adult life.11 At stake in every capacity case—from Spears’s to those
of any older adult in the early stages of Alzheimer’s—is whether an individual
may access the basic right of having personal decisions recognized by law.12 The

5. See Liza Magley, Clients with Diminished Capacity Seek Attorneys with Augmented Integrity, 27
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 705, 712 (2014) (describing capacity as a “threshold issue for each . . .
decision”). This Article is about mental capacity as a threshold to the private law doctrines of contract
and property (and related ancillary doctrines), not the distinct private law field of tort, where capacity
does not act as a threshold in the same way. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Persinger v. Holst, 639 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“A firmly
embedded principle in our jurisprudence is that legal documents must be executed by one possessing
the mental competence to reasonably understand the nature and effect of his action.”); In re Estate of
Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134, 155 (Tenn. 2013) (“Like any other civil contract, a marriage may be voided
‘for want of sufficient mental capacity.’” (quoting Cole v. Cole, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 57, 59 (1857)));
Netherton v. Netherton, 593 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (“Under the common law, a
contract is deemed void if a party lacks the requisite mental capacity at the time of contracting . . . .
Hence, . . . mental capacity is required to make a beneficiary designation.” (quoting Ivie v. Smith, 439
S.W.3d 189, 204 (Mo. 2014) (en banc))); Munzner v. Kushner, 375 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Ark. Ct. App.
2010) (“If the grantor is mentally competent at the time he executes the deed at issue, the deed is
valid.”).
7. See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 (1994) (reviewing DAVID
MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE
(1993)) [hereinafter Langbein, Will Contests] (“The United States is the home of capacity litigation.”).
Indeed, quick searches on Westlaw and Lexis reveal thousands of published and unpublished cases in
recent years.
8. See Greg Savage, Neuropsychological Assessment of Dementia, in DEMENTIA 52, 52 (David Ames,
John O’Brien & Alistair Burns eds., 5th ed. 2017).
9. See generally, e.g., In re Gentry’s Estate, 573 P.2d 322 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (addressing a
challenge to the testamentary capacity of an individual with paranoid schizophrenia).
10. See generally, e.g., In re Burris, 270 So. 3d 984 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (addressing a challenge
to testamentary capacity of a terminally ill individual who abused alcohol and opiates).
11. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow & Jia Tolentino, Britney Spears’s Conservatorship Nightmare, NEW
YORKER (July 3, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/american-chronicles/britney-spears-conser
vatorship-nightmare [https://perma.cc/5M37-MMHD (dark archive)].
12. Sam Boyle, Determining Capacity: How Beneficence Can Operate in an Autonomy-Focused Legal
Regime, 26 ELDER L.J. 35, 36–37 (2018) (“For most of us, having the legal right to make . . . decisions
removed would be a fundamental intrusion on our civil liberties.”).
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doctrine of capacity is nothing short of the mechanism by which we
circumscribe the boundaries of the community entitled to legal respect.13
Private law defines capacity as the cognitive function necessary to
understand the nature of a decision and its consequences, measured at the
moment the decision is made.14 Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of this
test, it has proven viciously difficult to apply, denying people access to the basic
protections of law on the one hand and facilitating disintegration of lives,
legacies, and relationships on the other.15 Part of this challenge is the empirical
difficulty of measuring cognition and the spectrum of ways in which dementia
and mental illness affect different people differently.16 But hanging over these
empirical difficulties is a normative one—what does it mean to understand the
nature and consequences of a decision?17
If we take a step back from the current doctrine, it is not obvious that
private-law capacity cases must involve such a quagmire. In cases challenging
an individual’s capacity, the parties offer the court two familiar stories about
what is going on, each of which is prima facie plausible. One side tells a story
about an ordinary change of heart by the decision maker—he used to love his
house, but no longer now that it’s empty; she swore she would never fall in love
again, but, well, we’ve heard that one before. The other side ascribes the
decision to the causal power of cognitive malfunction—a story about how this
13. Private law categorically declines to recognize the decisions of minors on the basis of a
presumptive generalization of their cognitive functioning. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Arrested
Development: Rethinking the Contract Age of Majority for the Twenty-First Century Adolescent, 76 MD. L.
REV. 405, 414 (2017) (“The age-based capacity rule for contracts is, as discussed above, a bright-line,
arbitrary test—a person is presumed to lack capacity . . . up until the moment she reaches the age of
majority.”). The doctrinal intervention proposed in this Article similarly adopts this categorical
exclusion of minors, and indeed, psychological research shows that people do not develop life stories
from which their decisions could be determined to follow until adolescence or early adulthood. See infra
notes 230–236.
14. NINA A. KOHN, ELDER LAW 17, 28 (2d ed. 2020).
15. See, e.g., Betsy Grey, Aging in the 21st Century: Using Neuroscience To Assess Competency in
Guardianships, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 735, 752–53 (summarizing inconsistency of medical tests of cognitive
abilities frequently relied on in litigation); Jennifer Moye, Daniel C. Marson & Barry Edelson,
Assessment of Capacity in an Aging Society, 68 AM. PSYCH. 158, 165 (2013) (observing that “clinicians
arrive at significantly discrepant judgments of capacity in dementia, focusing on different cognitive
and decisional abilities in patients, or holding different values from those of patients”); Rebekah Diller,
Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported DecisionMaking, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 496, 501–02 (2016) (noting that “[f]or the last several decades,
guardianship has been the subject of continual calls for reform”); Stephanie L. Tang, When “Yes” Might
Mean “No”: Standardizing State Criteria To Evaluate the Capacity To Consent to Sexual Activity for Elderly
with Neurocognitive Disorders, 22 ELDER L.J. 449, 449 (2015) (noting that “[t]he determination of
consent among elders of diminishing capacity is subject to a great deal of uncertainty and discrepancy
among the states”).
16. See Jody Corey-Bloom & Michael S. Rafii, The Natural History of Alzheimer’s Disease, in
DEMENTIA, supra note 8, at 453, 453.
17. See Grey, supra note 15, at 741 (“Fundamentally, the concept of capacity reflects our legal,
social, and moral view of human agency.”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2022)

1078

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

decision is one that the “real person” would never have made; the dementia is
speaking, not my father.18
The consequences of each of these stories are obvious. If the individual
had a change of heart or mind, the court ought to recognize the decision like it
would anyone else’s. If, however, a disease or injury is causing decisions that
are not the individual’s, the law should not recognize them. Equally apparent
are the facts that we would want to know to decide between the stories—facts
about the relationship of the decision with prior decisions, the relationship of
the decision maker with others, and the things that happened that could have
caused them to change their mind. The individual’s cognitive functioning is
relevant—it would tell us something about what kind of story we are dealing
with—but it is not dispositive.
From a philosophical perspective, dementia and similar illnesses pose
ethical and legal challenges in part because they implicate both the philosophical
constructs of personhood and personal identity. The philosophy of personhood tells
us what entitles an individual to the highest level of moral concern.19 In
contemporary philosophy, personhood is generally understood to be based on a
measure of cognitive function.20 In contrast, the philosophy of personal identity
tells us what makes us the same person across time—distinct from whether we
are persons in the first place.21 A growing group of philosophers—supported by
a convergence in fields as diverse as psychology, anthropology, and literary
theory—argues that personal identity is constituted of the stories of who we are,
our life stories.22 Because dementia can degrade our cognitive abilities, it can

18. Cf. Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity
To Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 105, 113–14 (1999) (describing an Alzheimer’s patient as ascribing
certain challenges to “the Alzheimer’s at work”).
19. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 45–76 (1985) [hereinafter
TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE]. See generally PERSONHOOD AND HEALTH CARE
(David C. Thomasma, David N. Weisstub & Christian Hervé eds., 2001) (describing the philosophy
of personhood as applied to healthcare).
20. See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp, The Failure of Theories of Personhood, in PERSONHOOD AND
HEALTH CARE, supra note 19, at 59, 59–60 (observing that the capacities thought to underlie
personhood are “usually cognitive”).
21. See HAROLD NOONAN, PERSONAL IDENTITY, at xi (1993) (“The nature of personal identity
over time and the link, if any, between personal identity and bodily identity . . . account[] for the
immense philosophical interest in the concept of personal identity.”).
22. See, e.g., MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 2 (1996); PAUL
RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 3, 65–69 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer trans., 1990)
(1984); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 204–05 (2d ed.
1984); TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, supra note 19, at 45–76; Kaiponanea T.
Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REV. 71, 103 (2014) [hereinafter Matsumura, Binding Future
Selves] (“Scholars in various fields have converged on an appreciation of the role that narrative plays
in the establishment of personal identity.”).
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threaten whether we are philosophical persons.23 Because it can disrupt the
stories of our lives, it can threaten our personal identity.24
This Article argues that the doctrine of capacity has failed because it is
based in the philosophy of personhood rather than personal identity. More
specifically, the doctrine is theoretically grounded in a cognitive theory of
personhood where it should be based in a narrative theory of personal identity. This
is so for two reasons. First, substantive private-law doctrines are essentially
concerned with personal identity rather than personhood.25 A gatekeeping
doctrine like capacity will necessarily fail if it tries to measure a philosophical
category different from those on which the substantive doctrines rely. Second,
private law is based on the fundamental commitment of facilitating human
flourishing through private ordering26 by respecting and enforcing private
decision-making.27 The law accomplishes this, in part, by establishing
mechanisms and adopting default rules that coincide with ordinary people’s
ways of thinking.28 And my empirical research has shown that, overwhelmingly,
seniors—the group most closely affected by the capacity doctrine—think of the
question of when the law should intervene in their decision-making as one of
the disruption of their personal identity.29

23. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 175–217 (1st ed. 1980).
24. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 148 (arguing that the loss of narrative capacity in
individuals with late-stage dementia can disrupt narrative identity).
25. See infra Section II.B.1.
26. This principle is most widely asserted by the “progressive property” school of contemporary
private-law scholarship. See generally, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN
FLOURISHING, at xiv (2018) (arguing that property law exists to promote human flourishing). But it
is widely accepted, at least implicitly, in contract scholarship, see HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL
HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 1–2 (2017) (arguing that contract law is designed to
promote self-determination), the law and economics literature in private law, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089, 1110 (1972) (arguing that the selection between “property rules” and “liability rules” in
private law is one of welfare maximization), and contemporary conceptualist theory, see, e.g., Henry E.
Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012) (arguing that property law
advances welfare by promoting our “interest in using things”); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 5–6 (2d ed. 2015) (arguing that contract law
advances our interest in having promises honored). This disagreement is rooted in different substantive
understandings of human flourishing, beside the point for our purposes here.
27. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002) (discussing
the principle of private ordering).
28. Cf. Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 877, 891 (2012) (“Although there are notable exceptions, intestacy statutes tend to reflect the
probable intent of most individuals.”). See generally DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 26, at 1–2
(explaining that states enforce contracts “to enhance people’s autonomy so that they can make their
lives meaningfully their own”).
29. See James Toomey, Understanding the Perspectives of Seniors on Dementia and Decision-Making,
12 AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 101, 106 (2020) [hereinafter Toomey, Perspectives of Seniors]; see also
James Toomey, How To End Our Stories: A Study of the Perspectives of Seniors on Dementia and DecisionMaking, 29 ELDER L.J. 1, 1–2 (2021) [hereinafter Toomey, How To End Our Stories].
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Under the new doctrine of capacity I propose, the law would recognize
decisions if and only if they are linked by a coherent narrative structure to the
story of the person making them. As explained in more detail below, a decision
follows as a narrative if it forms an intentional, intelligible, and coherent chain
of causation thematically related to the past and future of an individual’s life.30
To be clear, this test is concerned with the causal structure of a decision, not its
substance. As such, the narrative doctrine can accommodate a tremendous
amount of human change, so long as it has the right kind of cause. Telemachus
grows up,31 decisive Lady Macbeth ends despondent,32 and Rick sticks his neck
out.33 Under the narrative doctrine, the law would recognize decisions—no
matter how substantively new or different from the choices the individual had
made in the past—that relate to the individual’s life through a chain of plausible
narrative causes such as love, anger, learning, growth, reconciliation, and
estrangement. In the background of this standard, cognitive testing would still
play a role in extreme cases of cognitive weakness where an individual’s
philosophical personhood is questionable—after all, you can’t be the same
person if you are not a person at all.34
Thus, under the narrative doctrine of capacity, the law would respect a
decision following the reconciliation of a mother with a son where the cause of
her decision was narrative—a story of forgiveness, perhaps. The law would
consider the relationship between the decision and the past and future of the
mother’s life, whether the cause of the decision was her agency or something
else, and whether the decision is understandable as a coherent story of human
causation. Courts would draw on a wide range of narrative evidence—testimony
from the decision maker, if possible, and testimony from family and friends
either way. Sometimes the test would be met—she really forgave—and
sometimes it wouldn’t be—something else is going on. For example, the law
would respect the decision-making of Britney Spears so long as her decisions
coherently build an evolving story of who she is—maybe a story about a woman
who became famous too young who is making a life she prefers for herself in
private relationships with her children.35
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I analyze the capacity
doctrine in black-letter law and practice, excavating the extent to which its
narrow focus on contemporaneous cognitive functioning misses the point.
Further, I show that the highly medicalized contemporary approach to capacity
litigation is not inevitable—indeed, courts in the first half of the twentieth
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Section III.A.
See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOKS I–IV (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1996) (1614).
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH.
See CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942).
See infra Section III.C.
See Farrow & Tolentino, supra note 11.
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century were much more likely to rely on narrative facts than they are now,
though they often did so in an atheoretical way that was objectionable on other
grounds.
In Part II, I philosophically evaluate the premises of the capacity doctrine.
I find that the law’s understanding of capacity is grounded in a cognitive theory
of personhood but argue that personal identity is what matters in private-law
decision-making. Further, I argue that the narrative theory of personal identity
is the right one.
In Part III, I outline a new doctrine of capacity grounded in the narrative
theory of personal identity. The proposed rule is that the law would recognize
any decision that follows through a coherent narrative structure from the story
of an individual’s life but would decline to recognize decisions without a
narrative cause. I look to philosophy, psychology, and literary theory to distill
an objective structural definition of story.
Finally, in Part IV, I explore how this test would work in practice. I show
that the narrative test resolves errors incident to the cognitive doctrine and
argue that the narrative test would not be materially more difficult, more
expensive, or more susceptible to bias than the current doctrine.
I. CAPACITY CHALLENGES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Capacity is a threshold doctrine in private law—to avail oneself of the
protections of the law with respect to a particular decision, one must have the
capacity to make the decision.36 In our aging society, courts spend a great deal
of time litigating questions of capacity.37 This part offers an overview of the
doctrine and its failures in theory and practice. First, I summarize the current
doctrine of capacity—a measure of contemporaneous cognitive functioning.
Next, I show that the doctrine is failing to coherently adjudicate between
decisions entitled to the respect of law and those that are not. Finally, I argue
that things weren’t always this way—without the benefit of modern medicine,
courts a century ago frequently relied on narrative facts, and although some of
36. The doctrine of capacity must be distinguished from the doctrine of undue influence, though
they are frequently litigated together. See, e.g., Estate of Fabian, 222 A.3d 1143, 1152 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019) (distinguishing capacity and undue influence). The doctrine of undue influence, specifically
designed to protect vulnerable individuals from abuse or exploitation, does not recognize donative
transfers where a “wrongdoer exerted such influence over the donor that it overcame the donor’s free
will and caused the donor to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.”
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (AM. L.
INST. 2003). The doctrine of undue influence is narrower than the capacity doctrine (only pertaining
to a subset of decisions), requires a malicious third-party, and is more substantively normative. See,
e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
180–81 (8th ed. 2009). The doctrine has been subject to scholarly criticism in its own right, see id., but
this Article sets aside for future research the implications, if any, of the narrative theory of personal
identity for the doctrine of undue influence.
37. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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these decisions were objectionable on other grounds, the case law was in many
ways more coherent than it is now.
A.

The Law of Capacity

Decisions made without sufficient capacity will not be enforced by private
law. At a high level of abstraction, the law understands decision-making
capacity to be a measure of an individual’s “physical ability to think and
reason.”39 Adults are generally presumed to have the required capacity to make
private-law decisions.40 Although there is some variation among the standards
of capacity required for different kinds of decisions, “the default question tends
to be: ‘Does the individual understand the nature and consequences of the
decision he or she is making?’”41 In seeking to answer this question, the law
thinks of capacity as a binary concept—the individual either had the mental
capacity required to make a particular decision or not.42 And an individual’s
capacity is considered at the moment of a challenged decision.43 Evidence about
the individual at other times may be admissible, but only to the extent it is
probative of their cognitive function at the time.44
38

38. See, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tex. 2017) (“Documents executed by one
who lacks sufficient legal or mental capacity may be avoided.”); Larson v. Larson, 192 N.E.2d 594, 597
(Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (“A marriage contract will be invalidated by the want of consent of capable persons;
it requires the mutual consent of two persons of sound mind, and if at the time one is mentally incapable
of giving an intelligent consent to what is done, with an understanding of the obligations assumed, the
solemnization is a mere idle ceremony.”); Bond v. Branning Mfg. Co., 140 N.C. 381, 383, 52 S.E. 929,
929 (1906) (“To execute either a will or a deed, it is abundantly established that the party must have
sufficient mental capacity . . . .”).
39. KOHN, supra note 14, at 17; see also 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.6 (2d ed. 1998) (“The traditional test is a ‘cognitive’ one.”).
40. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 14, at 153 (“It is generally presumed that all adults have the ability
and right to make their own decisions.”).
41. See id. at 28.
42. See, e.g., KELLY PURSER, CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND THE LAW: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS 14 (2017) (“[L]egal professionals see capacity . . . as a dualistic construct in that the person
either has capacity to make the decision, execute the document, or enter the transaction, or they do
not.”).
43. See, e.g., Paine v. Sullivan, 950 N.E.2d 874, 883 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“It is John’s capacity
at the time he executed the will that is at issue.”); Stephan v. Millennium Nursing & Rehab Ctr., Inc.,
279 So. 3d 532, 540–41 (Ala. 2018) (“The more important question is whether Stephan has overcome
her burden of demonstrating contractual incapacity at the very time of the transaction.” (emphasis
added)); In re Nurse, 160 A.D.3d 745, 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (“Instead, it must be determined that
the individual was incompetent at the specific time of the challenged transaction.”).
44. See, e.g., England v. Cary, No. 05-17-00724-CV, 2018 WL 3342694, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. July
9, 2018) (“Courts may also look to the state of mind at other times if it tends to show ones’ state of
mind on the day a document was executed.”).
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Legal capacity is a test of actual cognitive functioning, and no particular
clinical diagnosis is dispositive to establish a lack of capacity.45 Indeed, the law
does not require that people undergo cognitive testing, and, formally speaking,
any evidence suggestive of the decision maker’s cognition is admissible.46
However, the law’s focus on facts about the individual’s contemporaneous
cognitive function has led courts to rely heavily on medical testimony in
adjudicating capacity questions.47
The specific level of cognitive functioning the law requires to make each
kind of private-law decision varies.48 Challenges to testamentary capacity—the
cognitive functioning required to execute a valid will—appear to be the most
common form of capacity litigation.49 Testamentary capacity generally requires
that an individual know and understand “(1) what property they own, (2) the
natural objects of their bounty, and (3) the nature of the act performed.”50 The
threshold for testamentary capacity is frequently contrasted with that of the
capacity required to enter into a contract, give a gift, convey property by deed,
or otherwise conduct business, which is higher.51 In the other direction, courts
45. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schlueter, 994 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 2000) (joining “several other
states” in holding that a diagnosis of senile dementia is not sufficient proof of lack of capacity); see also
Jalayne J. Arias, A Time To Step In: Legal Mechanisms for Protecting Those with Declining Capacity, 39 AM.
J.L. & MED. 134, 140 (2013) (“[U]nder a majority of capacity definitions, a diagnosis of dementia alone
is not conclusive evidence that an individual lacks capacity.”).
46. See, e.g., In re Estate of Clemence, No. 332099, 2017 WL 4938814, at *12 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 31, 2017) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has specifically found lay opinion testimony admissible to
establish a decedent’s testamentary capacity.”).
47. See, e.g., In re Giaquinto, 164 A.D.3d 1527, 1529 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (“Respondent has
failed to present any evidence, including the medical records and affidavits, that showed that decedent
lacked testamentary capacity or mental competency at the time of the execution of the 2013 will.”); In
re Estate of Washburn, 690 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.H. 1997) (“All the testifying physicians agreed that
the medical evidence indicated that the testatrix had Alzheimer’s disease in April 1993, a year after the
will’s execution.”); In re Will of Cirnigliaro, No. 2016-34, 2017 WL 6763159, at *4 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec.
28, 2017) (unpublished table disposition) (“[T]he objectants have not produced any credible medical
evidence demonstrating that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity.”). However, formally,
“[d]etermination of incapacity is a legal and not a medical decision.” 18 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS
§ 7 (1992).
48. See MIKE E. JORGENSEN, ELDER LAW 49 (2008) (“Because legal capacity is generally
determined in light of the transaction involved, courts have developed different legal standards for
capacity for different legal documents.”).
49. Cf. Forrest J. Heyman, A Patchwork Quilt: The Case for Collage Contest Model Ante-Mortem
Probate in Light of Alaska’s Recent Ante-Mortem Legislation, 19 ELDER L.J. 385, 406 (2012) (arguing that
if testamentary capacity challenges had to be brought before the death of the individual whose capacity
is challenged, they would be less common).
50. JORGENSEN, supra note 48, at 49.
51. See id. at 50 (“The standard for contractual and donative capacity in most states is a higher
and more demanding standard of conduct than the standard for testamentary capacity.”); see also, e.g.,
In re Martinico, 177 A.D. 882, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (“Less capacity is required to enable one to
make a will than to make other contracts.”). But see Marback v. Marback, 235 Cal. App. 2d 354, 356
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“The degree of mental competency requisite to sustain the validity of a deed
has been held to be the same degree of competency required to execute a will.”).
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have held that the mental capacity required to enter into or end a valid marriage
is low, and that an individual who lacks the capacity to enter into other contracts
may still be able to get married or divorced.52
Finally, the law provides a mechanism, known as guardianship or
conservatorship, to address the needs of individuals considered to lack capacity
globally.53 The terminology varies by jurisdiction,54 but the essential idea is the
same—through procedures established by statute, courts may, upon petition,
appoint an individual legally empowered (called a “guardian” here, for
convenience) to make decisions (or some class of decisions) on behalf of an
“incapacitated” individual.55 In other words, a guardian is an individual
appointed by the court to handle the private-law needs of someone whose
decisions do not meet the thresholds of capacity in general. The standards and
procedures required to establish guardianship vary from state to state, but all
require the court to find that the allegedly incapacitated person is generally
incapacitated.56 In addition, some states require guardianship to be the least
restrictive alternative, require courts to find the possibility of harm to the
person or others absent guardianship,57 or require a diagnosis of certain
conditions.58
Because a guardianship is, in many ways, a finding of generalized legal
incapacity, guardianship proceedings look similar to challenges to specific
decisions on capacity grounds. For example, although any evidence tending to
prove cognitive deficits is admissible, courts rely most heavily on medical

52. See 177 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS § 4 (2019) (“[C]ourts have pointed out that the
threshold of mental capacity is relatively low, so that even though a person might be under
conservatorship and thus could not enter into an ordinary contract, he or she may have capacity to get
married.”).
53. The guardianship system has been subject to wide-ranging criticism in recent years and many
scholars have advocated replacing it with a system of “supported decision-making” under which a
“supporter” is appointed to help an individual with cognitive impairments make their own decisions.
See, e.g., Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy, and Supported Healthcare Decisionmaking, 79 MD. L.
REV. 257, 272 (2020). This system has been adopted by some states. Id. But for the most part,
guardianship remains the system we have, and some scholars have questioned whether supported
decision-making would be substantially different in practice. See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A.
Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117
PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2013). Because this Article is about the threshold question of incapacity,
not how guardianships ought to be conducted after that determination, I need not resolve this debate
here.
54. See KOHN, supra note 14, at 154.
55. See id. at 154–57.
56. Arias, supra note 45, at 147.
57. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 2022).
58. See Grey, supra note 15, at 749.
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testimony.59 And guardianship petitions are adversarial.60 Much like other
capacity challenges, guardianship hearings involve contestation between parties
advancing competing stories about the allegedly incapacitated person.61 In
short, the doctrine of capacity—in all its iterations—is based in a momentary
cognitive test and is most often adjudicated between competing medical
testimony.
B.

The Failure of the Capacity Doctrine

This section argues that the doctrine of capacity, understood as a test of
contemporaneous cognitive functioning, is failing to coherently adjudicate
between those decisions the law ought to respect and those it need not. First,
the doctrine encounters enormous practical difficulties in consistently
measuring cognitive function. Second, even if such measurements could be
made consistently, the doctrine has never answered important normative
questions about its demands and how it affects people differently. Finally, if we
look at the cases, we can see that the doctrine—even if it were reaching
consistent results on its own terms—misses the point by failing to call upon
courts to adjudicate between the prima facie plausible stories presented by the
parties.
1. Empirical Challenges of Measuring Cognition
Courts applying the doctrine of capacity reach wildly inconsistent results,
particularly in cases involving individuals with some cognitive dysfunction
short of extreme decay.62 Indeed, whether an individual with some cognitive
decline will be entitled to have a particular decision recognized—or will be
denied access to basic legal protections—appears to turn as much on the judge
that oversees the case, the clinicians that conduct a medical evaluation, and
whether the individual is medically tested at all as anything about the reality of
their underlying cognitive mechanics.63 Although the doctrine is not hard to
59. See, e.g., In re DiCillo, No. 2006-G-2718, 2007 WL 1113964, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13,
2007) (chiding appellants for “present[ing] no contrary expert medical testimony” but only “br[inging]
forth a number of lay witnesses” and finding the evidence sufficient for a guardianship).
60. See KOHN, supra note 14, at 156 (“The guardianship process is, by design, an adversarial
one.”).
61. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Miller, 932 N.E.2d 420, 422, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)
(resolving a question of capacity between a story of ordinary, family-induced stress, and a claim of the
degradation of the individual’s identity as the result of dementia).
62. See Grey, supra note 15, at 752–54.
63. See, e.g., id.; see also LAUREN BARRITT LISI & SAIDY BARINAGA-BURCH, CTR. FOR SOC.
GERONTOLOGY, NATIONAL STUDY OF GUARDIANSHIP SYSTEMS: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 648–50 (1994) (finding that nearly half of all formal guardianship proceedings
last less than 15 minutes); KOHN, supra note 14, at 185 (describing as “well-founded” the observation
that some courts are “too quick to appoint guardians, and do not properly oversee them”); Bradley E.S.
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apply in extreme cases—where an individual is either plainly healthy or
cognitively far gone—it struggles in the more frequently-litigated gray areas
between these poles.64
Part of this inconsistency arises from the difficulty medicine has in
measuring cognitive abilities.65 Indeed, the most commonly relied upon medical
tests of cognitive function are inconsistent and difficult to interpret.66 And
although recent advances have made it easier to diagnose the biological causes
of dementia (for example, whether an individual has Alzheimer’s disease), there
have not been corresponding advances in measurement of symptomatic decline,
or the actual cognitive functioning with which the doctrine is concerned.67
Moreover, these medical tests can be expensive and difficult to access for many
individuals of questionable cognitive ability, particularly in medically
underserved areas.68
The complex nature of dementia and other mental illnesses also
contributes to the inconsistency in courts’ decisions regarding the capacity
Fogel, The Completely Insane Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of Monomania on Testamentary Capacity,
42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 67, 111 (2007) (discussing the “arbitrary results that are based more on
fact-finder bias than on well-defined rules of law” that often appear in testamentary capacity litigation).
64. Arias, supra note 45, at 137 (“This not only raises concerns about how to classify those that
fall between the [poles of capacity and incapacity], but also highlights the lack of legal protections for
those within the gap.”).
65. See Grey, supra note 15, at 753 (“Primary care physicians may fail to recognize dementia in
more than fifty percent of affected patients.”).
66. See, e.g., Joanne Feeney, George M. Savva, Clair O’Regan, Bellinda King-Kallimanis, Hilary
Cronin & Rose Anne Kenny, Measurement Error, Reliability, and Minimum Detectable Change in the MiniMental State Examination, Montreal Cognitive Assessment, and Color Trails Test Among Community Living
Middle-Aged and Older Adults, 53 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 1107, 1107 (2016) (finding inter-rater
reliabilities of 0.81 and 0.75 on the same metric for the most commonly used cognitive capacity tests).
67. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 15, at 771–72 (discussing recent advances in neuropsychological
testing that have increased diagnostic accuracy for purposes of distinguishing between Alzheimer’s
disease and other causes of cognitive symptoms). The most commonly used tests of cognitive
functioning, the Mini-Mental State Exam and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, were developed in
1975 and 1995, respectively. See Marshal F. Folstein, Susan E. Folstein & Paul R. McHugh, ‘MiniMental State’: A Practical Method for Grading the Cognitive State of Patients for the Clinician, 12 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RSCH. 189, 189 (1975); John Hobson, The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA),
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 764, 764 (2015). See generally Ziad S. Nasreddine, Natalie A. Phillips, Valérie
Bédirian, Simon Charbonneau, Victor Whitehead, Isabelle Collin, Jeffrey L. Cummings & Howard
Chertkow, The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: A Brief Screening Tool for Mild Cognitive
Impairment, 53 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 695 (2005) (conducting a validation study for the MoCA).
68. See William Perry, Laura Lacritz, Tresa Roebuck-Spencer, Cheryl Silver, Robert L. Denney,
John Meyers, Charles E. McConnel, Neil Pliskin, Deb Adler, Christopher Alban, Mark Bondi,
Michelle Braun, Xavier Cagigas, Morgan Daven, Lisa Drozdick, Norman L. Foster, Ula Hwang, Laurie
Ivey, Grant Iverson, Joel Kramer, Melinda Lantz, Lisa Latts, Ana Maria Lopez, Michael Malone, Lori
Martin-Plank, Katie Maslow, Don Melady, Melissa Messer, Randi Most, Margaret P. Norris, David
Shafer, Colin M. Thomas, Laura Thornhill, Jean Tsai, Nirav Vakharia, Martin Waters & Tamara
Golden, Population Health Solutions for Assessing Cognitive Impairment in Geriatric Patients, 33 ARCHIVES
CLINICAL NEUROPSYCH. 655, 671 (2018) (noting that “[t]here are deficiencies in health services in
rural and economically disadvantaged America, resulting in a large gap in access to care and differences
in resources such as care coordinators and cognitive specialists”).
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doctrine. The course of Alzheimer’s disease, the most common cause of
dementia, in different individuals is markedly heterogeneous, presenting a
“diverse spectrum of symptoms” at different times.69 Indeed, many individuals
with Alzheimer’s disease are entirely asymptomatic,70 the onset of symptoms
can take decades,71 and the disease can proceed slowly or quickly over the course
of years when they arise.72 The causes and course of other dementias and mental
illnesses are even less well-studied and understood.73 Moreover, even healthy
individuals experience changes in cognition as they age, which can be
interpreted as dementia by family members and medical experts.74 Further,
many older adults are diagnosed with Mild Cognitive Impairment, a vague
diagnostic category that is often a preclinical form of dementia,75 but many
people with this diagnosis “do not experience a further cognitive decline and
may even revert to normal status.”76
Finally, although the doctrine is clear that what matters is actual cognitive
functioning, there is substantial sociological evidence that the label “dementia”
does a great deal of work in how those with the disease are perceived and treated
69. See Corey-Bloom & Rafii, supra note 16, at 453 (stating that reliably measuring progression is
"difficult because of variability between and within subjects").
70. See Grey, supra note 15, at 765 (“AD pathology can be present in individuals who do not show
cognitive symptoms.”).
71. See Corey-Bloom & Rafii, supra note 16, at 453 (“Converging evidence from longitudinal
studies of clinically normal elderly and familial AD cohorts strongly suggests that the AD
pathophysiological process begins decades before the manifestation of clinical dementia.”).
72. See id. at 458.
73. See generally Melanie D. Sweeney, Axel Montagne, Abhay P. Sagare, Daniel A. Nation, Lon
S. Schneider, Helena C. Chui, Michaell G. Harrington, Judy Pa, Meng Law, Danny J.J. Wang, Russell
E. Jacobs, Fergus N. Doubal, Joel Ramirez, Sandra E. Black, Maiken Nedergaard, Helene Benveniste,
Martin Dichgans, Constantino Iadecola, Seth Love, Philip M. Bath, Hugh S. Markus, Rustam A.
Salman, Stuart M. Alan, Terence J. Quinn, Rajesh N. Kalaria, David J. Werring, Roxana O. Carare,
Rhian M. Touyz, Stever C.R. Williams, Michael A. Moskowitz, Zyonimir S. Katusic, Sarah E. Lutz,
Orly Lazarov, Richard D. Minshall, Jalees Rehman, Thomas P. Davis, Cheryl L. Wellington, Hector
M. Gonzalez, Chun Yuan, Samuel N. Lockhart, Timothy M. Hughes, Christopher L.H. Chen,
Perminder Sachdev, John T. O’Brien, Ingmar Skoog, Leondro Pantoni, Deborah R. Gustafson, Geert
Jan Biessels, Anders Wallin, Eric E. Smith, Vincent Mok, Adrian Wong, Peter Passmore, Frederick
Barkof, Majon Muller, Monique M.B. Breteler, Gustavo C. Roman, Edith Hamel, Sudha Seshadri,
Rebecca F. Gottesman, Mark A. van Buchem, Zoe Arvanitakis, Julie A. Schneider, Lester R. Drewes,
Vladimir Hachinski, Caleb E. Finch, Arthur W. Toga, Joanna M. Wardlaw & Berislav V. Zlokovic,
Vascular Dysfunction—The Disregarded Partner of Alzheimer’s Disease, 15 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 158
(2019) (summarizing what is known about vascular dementia, an understudied but prevalent cause of
dementia).
74. See generally Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin & Brian Knutson, Decision Making in the Ageing
Brain: Changes in Affective and Motivational Circuits, 16 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 278 (2015)
(summarizing patterns of cognitive and decision-making change in healthy aging).
75. See Karen Ritchie & Sylvaine Artero, Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI): A Historical
Perspective, in DEMENTIA, supra note 8, at 419, 421 (“[M]any clinical observations of the long-term
outcome of cognitive complaints . . . led to the general conclusion by many neurologists that subclinical
cognitive disorder in the elderly is in fact principally, if not exclusively, early-stage dementia.”).
76. Id. at 422–23.
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by society.77 Anecdotally, many people report being treated differently by
family and friends after a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, including being treated like
a child and being excluded from plans and conversations.78 And sociologists
have widely confirmed that “receiving a dementia diagnosis allocates [an] older
person to a new lower status social group,” to some extent regardless of their
functional impairment at the time of the diagnosis.79 This bias appears to bleed
into legal practice where, the language of the test notwithstanding, “[i]n some
cases, disability itself—as opposed to functional ability—appears to be used as
the justification for guardianship.”80
2. Normative Challenges of the Cognitive Doctrine
Scholars have ascribed part of the challenge of the doctrine to its
normative under-theorization. First, the doctrine’s vague language does not
offer a fully-realized theory of how much cognitive functioning is required in
order to make particular decisions.81 Indeed, “where we strike this balance
reflects our social values, moral judgments, and legal principles.”82 And neither
courts nor scholars have articulated a complete theory of the levels of
“understanding” required for access to the protections of law, nor what
“understanding” is and how we measure it.83 After all, we permit cognitively
healthy individuals to make decisions, the consequences of which they do not
fully understand (and could not realistically understand) all the time.84
77. See, e.g., TOM KITWOOD, DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED: THE PERSON COMES FIRST 7
(1997) (“Alzheimer victims, dements, elderly mentally infirm—these and similar descriptions devalue
the person, and make a unique and sensitive human being into an instance of some category devised
for convenience or control.”); Daniel R. George, Overcoming the Social Death of Dementia Through
Language, 376 LANCET 586, 586 (2010) (“The everyday language we use to describe dementia shapes
our perceptions of brain ageing and even contributes to what has been called the ‘social death’ of those
most severely affected.”).
78. See, e.g., How Are You Treated Differently Since Diagnosis, ALZHEIMERSDISEASE.NET
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://alzheimersdisease.net/living/different-treatment [https://perma.cc/Q4SB-F3Q
4] (“Roughly 58 percent of participants said they are treated differently by a spouse or partner, while
47 percent said they are treated differently by a co-worker, colleague, or supervisor. About 46 percent
said they are treated differently by their friends, while 45 percent said they experienced a change in
treatment from their children. Similarly, 45 percent said they are treated differently by their
acquaintances and 40 percent said their parents treat them differently.”).
79. Alison Milne, The ‘D’ Word: Reflections on the Relationship Between Stigma, Discrimination and
Dementia, 19 J. MENTAL HEALTH 227, 228 (2010); see also Jane M. Scholl & Steven R. Sabat,
Stereotypes, Stereotype Threat and Ageing: Implications for the Understanding and Treatment of People with
Alzheimer’s Disease, 28 AGEING & SOC’Y 103, 103 (2008).
80. KOHN, supra note 14, at 185.
81. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 15, at 738.
82. Id.
83. See Toomey, How To End Our Stories, supra note 29, at 3.
84. For instance, in the securities laws, we require disclosure of certain information to the public,
but we do not ask whether any individual member of the public trading in securities has read and
understood, or even could understand, the content of those disclosures. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(1)
(authorizing the SEC to issue regulations regarding disclosures for asset-backed securities).
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Moreover, the cognitive doctrine necessarily suffers a theoretically
unexplained inconsistency in the way it treats people of differing lifelong
cognitive functioning. Among the adult population, there is a range of baseline
cognitive functionality.85 Alzheimer’s disease affects those with high lifelong
functioning differently from those with low functioning—those with higher
lifelong functioning tend to experience less decline longer into its course but
eventually decline more rapidly than others.86 But the law applies a universal
threshold, demanding the same absolute level of cognitive functioning from
every decision maker, regardless of their lifelong functioning. This necessarily
means that those with higher functioning will change more from themselves
before the law intervenes, while lower-functioning individuals will see the law
intervene in their decision-making much more quickly.87 This disparity is
harmful to both groups in different ways—higher-functioning people are
permitted to do more damage to their stories and relationships in their decline,
and lower-functioning people are denied autonomy more quickly.
3. Failure To Adjudicate Between Prima Facie Plausible Stories of Apparent
Normative Significance
Reading capacity opinions closely reveals that, where courts focus on the
doctrine and the contemporaneous cognitive functioning of the individual
decision maker,88 they miss the point. Since these cases involve human stories—
about people, families, and relationships—the courts ought to adjudicate
between the two prima facie plausible stories the parties present. Instead, they
look only to the individual’s cognitive functioning at the time of the decision.
Take, for instance, the 2019 case In re Guardianship of Thrash.89 Charles
Inness Thrash was “a millionaire and owner of a successful automotive repair
85. See generally Christopher F. Chabris, Cognitive and Neurobiological Mechanisms of the Law of
General Intelligence, in INTEGRATING THE MIND: DOMAIN GENERAL VS. DOMAIN SPECIFIC
PROCESSES IN HIGHER COGNITION 449 (Maxwell J. Roberts ed., 2007) (discussing cognitive
mechanisms underlying the range in general intelligence among the population).
86. See Corey-Bloom & Rafii, supra note 16, at 458 (“The cognitive reserve hypothesis suggests
that higher education delays the onset of accelerated decline but that, once it begins, it is more rapid
in persons with higher education.”).
87. An example of this in practice may be the case Woodville v. Woodville, 60 S.E. 140 (W. Va.
1908), where the court highlighted the high functioning of a grantor of property, instead of his apparent
memory loss. See id. at 141, 143. There, the grantor of property was noted as a man of “more than
ordinary intelligence” who suffered from “the loss of memory at times” and, as the result of dementia,
was only “at times” the “same remarkably intelligent and strong-minded man” he had been the rest of
his life. Id. But the court looked at his contemporaneous writing, found the use of “intelligent and
sensible diction,” and held that he had sufficient capacity. Id.
88. See, e.g., Wiesman v. Wiesman, No. 2017AP466, 2018 WL 4943805, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished table decision) (focusing on cognitive functioning rather than considering
whether a decision to change a will to be more beneficial to a child who had become more active in
their care was the decision an individual with dementia really wanted).
89. No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2019).
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shop.”90 For most of his adult life, Thrash lived in a small apartment above his
shop, where he had only one employee, and acted with the kind of fiscal
conservatism that allowed him to amass a small fortune.91 In 2009, when he was
seventy-one years old, Thrash began dating a woman named Laura Martinez.92
Both Thrash and Laura had been married before, with adult children (in
Thrash’s case, stepchildren) from prior marriages.93 Throughout their
relationship, Thrash paid many of Laura’s expenses, and in 2016, Thrash and
Laura moved into a house he purchased for $750,000 in cash.94 After that,
Thrash’s sister and stepchildren petitioned the court for guardianship, alleging
that he was incapacitated.95
Based on the facts, there are two prima facie plausible stories about these
years of Thrash’s life. The first is a story of abuse. It is a story, told by Thrash’s
family members, about Laura, a manipulative woman taking advantage of a
wealthy and vulnerable old man for her own financial gain.96 Indeed, Thrash’s
stepdaughters “described Laura as a woman he dated who wanted him to help
her pay her bills, to marry her, and to change ‘a lot of things in his life,’ including
his will.”97 They testified that “they believed Thrash would not take” the actions
Laura was pushing him to.98 And Thrash plainly suffered from some cognitive
impairment. A psychiatrist appointed to examine Thrash reported that he had,
inter alia, some level of Alzheimer’s dementia.99 This story of abuse is a
plausible one. We know these stories happen.100 If it is true, we know the
purchase of the house should be reversed and the guardianship granted—to do
otherwise would be a grave harm to Thrash, the story of his life, and those he
truly cares about.101
The other story is a love story. It’s the story of a man unlucky-in-love until
he found a woman in the twilight years of his life with whom he wanted to
90. Id. at *1.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at *6.
94. See id. at *1.
95. See id.
96. See id. at *6.
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Anna Coluccia, Andrea Pozza, Fabio Ferretti, Fulvio Carabellese, Alessandra Masti
& Giacomo Gualtieri, Online Romance Scams: Relational Dynamics and Psychological Characteristics of the
Victims and Scammers. A Scoping Review, 16 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY MENTAL HEALTH
24, 25 (2020) (reviewing case studies and other research on romance scams, where an individual
pretends to be in love with an individual with the intent to obtain money).
101. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 230 (1993) (“[W]hen . . . we consider the patient’s whole
life, not just its sad final stages, . . . we consider his future in terms of how it affects the character of
the whole.”).
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commit in a way he never had before. At first blush, there was at least as much
evidence in the record to support this love story as there was to support one of
abuse. In fact, nearly everyone—Laura, Thrash, the lawyer with whom Thrash
drew up an estate plan, the investigator appointed by the court, and even some
of Thrash’s family members—agreed that Thrash appeared happy and in love
with Laura.102 As for the purchase of the house, Laura explained that Thrash
had been “saving money to buy a ‘gingerbread house.’”103 And there was
substantial evidence that Thrash was not all that far gone. He was
conversational, regularly spoke coherently and independently to his lawyer and
others, and was clearly capable of love.104 This story, too, is entirely plausible.105
If it is true, the law has no business helping Thrash’s family (concerned with its
own inheritance, perhaps) stand in the way. To do so would render a profound
harm to the privilege of love and the autonomy of the self.106
The question of which story is true—the love story or the abuse story—is
more than just a question of Thrash’s momentary cognitive functioning. People
who have lost some cognitive functioning, as Charles Thrash had, can fall in
love.107 And indeed, the case is challenging under the cognitive paradigm
precisely because, although he had lost some capacity, Thrash remained
functional in many ways, could carry on complex conversations, and would
discuss his love for Laura and his desire to buy the house.108 Adjudicating
between the stories depends on a variety of facts—including not only Thrash’s
cognitive function, but also his feelings; the explanations and causes of his
actions; Laura’s motivations and those of the family members; and whether the
102. See In re Guardianship of Thrash, 2019 WL 6499225, at *8 (“[T]he probate court heard
testimony from both Laura and Thrash that Thrash was happy with Laura.”); see also id. at *6
(“[Attorney] Augsburger testified that during his private consultations, Thrash indicated he wanted to
take care of Laura.”); id. at *7 (observing that the court-appointed investigator testified that “Laura
continued caring for Thrash’s daily needs, and Thrash appeared to be happy and well taken care of by
Laura”); id. (observing that Thrash’s great-niece “testified Thrash seemed happy in his home and living
with Laura”).
103. Id. at *6.
104. See id.
105. See Sherry Amatenstein, First Love Late in Life. Yes, It Happens! Here’s Proof, NEXTTRIBE (Feb.
12, 2021), https://nexttribe.com/finding-love-later-in-life/ [https://perma.cc/4H8E-KX5R] (discussing
“touching, relatable, and highly romantic” stories of “couples who had experienced their first love later
in life”).
106. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”).
107. See Eva Feder Kittay, At the Margins of Personhood, 116 ETHICS 100, 116 (2005) (discussing
the author’s loving relationship with her daughter with severe mental illness); see also DANIEL KEYES,
FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON 270 (1959) (“I told her I didnt like her any more. I told her I didnt want
to be smart any more either. Thats not true but. I still love her and I still want to be smart but I had to
say that so she woud go away.”). See generally, e.g., JESSICA BRYAN, LOVE IS AGELESS: STORIES
ABOUT ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE (2002) (summarizing personal narratives of love stories involving
people with Alzheimer’s dementia).
108. In re Guardianship of Thrash, 2019 WL 6499225, at *6.
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purchase of the house was the culmination of savings for this specific purpose
or something Thrash, if it was really him, would never have done.
Applying the doctrine of capacity, however, the court did not decide which
of these stories was true. Instead, it relied primarily on medical testimony about
Thrash’s cognitive abilities. It held sufficient to establish the guardianship “two
medical reports, both concluding that Thrash lacked capacity . . . because he
could not comprehend complex matters.”109 Further, the court noted that “Laura
did not produce any medical evidence controverting the medical reports
concluding Thrash lacked capacity.”110 It granted a guardianship over Thrash’s
estate.111
Thus, because the court did not adjudicate between the two stories before
it, we have no way of knowing whether it reached the right outcome in this case,
even assuming that its assessment of Thrash’s cognitive functioning was
medically defensible. Instead, we are left with the material and troubling
possibility that the court did a bad thing—denying Charles Thrash the freedom
to make his own decisions in life and love and facilitating Thrash’s
stepdaughters securement of their inheritance against his wishes. Maybe that is
not what happened, but based on the court’s analysis and the doctrine it applied,
it could be.
Similarly, consider another challenging case, In re Estate of Marsh,112 where
the court found sufficient capacity notwithstanding facially similar levels of
cognitive functioning as in Thrash. Clara Marsh lived near her daughter in
Xenia, in southwestern Ohio; her son lived a three-and-a-half hour drive away
in Cleveland.113 Her longstanding estate plan divided her assets equally between
son and daughter.114 But after she moved into the Alzheimer’s ward at a local
nursing home, tensions between the family members arose.115 The daughter—
who saw Clara every day—believed that Clara was incapacitated and filed for
guardianship.116 The son disagreed.117 In the midst of the guardianship
proceedings, Clara handwrote a note that said, in its entirety, “Because of all
the legal problems [my daughter] Elaine and [her husband] are causing, I am
afraid my final wishes will be ignored. To prevent this from happening, this is

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *3.
No. 2010 CA 78, 2011 WL 5137235 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
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my new will: I leave everything to my son Richard and his wife Sam. I love you
all very much.”118 Then she died.119
Once again, at least two plausible stories are apparent. In the first one,
Clara needs help as her dementia advances and she becomes increasingly
paranoid. Instead of recognizing the extent to which the daughter with whom
she is closer is trying to help her, she sees salvation in the distant son who cannot
see how far she is gone. In the other story, however, Clara really made the
decision to disinherit her daughter—she saw that the daughter had come to feel
entitled to control her life and her money because she was physically closer.
And again, the normative stakes are clear—if the first story is true, the court
should find the handwritten will invalid, but if the second is true, it should be
enforced. Similarly straightforward are the facts needed to adjudicate between
the stories—facts about Clara’s relationships with her children, their behavior,
and her evolving understanding of herself and family.
But the court in Marsh did not tell us which of these stories is true. It
simply looked to the evidence regarding Marsh’s cognitive capacities at the time
of the execution of the handwritten will and acknowledged that while “[t]here
appears to be acceptance of the facts that the decedent was diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s by Dr. Byers and was found to struggle with ‘significant cognitive
impairments’ by Dr. Kraus,” “neither [doctor] addressed the criteria for
testamentary capacity and thus did not preclude the possibility.”120 And the
daughter, the court held, simply had not put forth sufficient evidence of Clara’s
cognitive state at the time she wrote the will to overcome the presumption of
capacity.121 The court granted summary judgment to the son.122 Was that the
right thing to do? Who knows. Maybe the court properly safeguarded the rights
and autonomy of Ms. Marsh; maybe it ratified an inexplicable decision that
Marsh herself never really wanted to make.
Although the doctrine gives no formal role to facts about the story of a
particular decision—indeed, formally, any facts before and after the decision are
irrelevant on their own—some contemporary courts feel the clear normative
importance of deciding between the competing stories the parties offer.123
Indeed, many capacity opinions bolster their doctrinal, cognitive conclusions by
explaining them in terms of the story of the individual.

118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id. at *5.
122. Id. at *6.
123. See, e.g., Greasheimer v. Bridgewater, KNLCV186036815S, 2020 WL 1496584, at *6–7
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2020).
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For example, In re Estate of Farr,124 the Kansas Supreme Court confronted
a challenge to testamentary capacity where decedent Farr disinherited his two
granddaughters—the children of his deceased son, Everett—in favor of two
surviving sons.125 The court, applying the doctrine of capacity, noted that “[t]he
time when the will is made is the time of primary importance,” and grounded
its decision in the observation that “[t]hose present at the execution of the will,
medical professionals and a long-time acquaintance, believed Farr to have been
aware of what was going on when the will was executed.”126
The court went on to note, however, that “[t]here was evidence that would
support that Farr intended to disinherit” the granddaughters.127 Indeed, as the
court took the time to tell us, testimony indicated that sometime after Everett
had passed away, Everett’s wife sold the family farm and moved elsewhere
against Farr’s wishes.128 For a man as “stubborn, hard-headed, and sometimes
difficult”129 as Farr, this is certainly a plausible, if not particularly admirable,
story of disinheritance. It is, after all, vaguely reminiscent of King Lear.130
In short, some contemporary courts appear to recognize that cognitive
ability conclusions on their own are not entirely satisfactory in this context. But
that is all that the current doctrine tells courts to look to, and as compelling as
a discussion about an individual’s life story may be, it is, legally speaking,
superfluous.
C.

The Medicalization of the Capacity Doctrine and the Decline of Narrative
Analysis

The formulation of the doctrine of capacity as a measure of
contemporaneous cognitive functioning has remained consistent for at least the
past two centuries.131 But before the development of modern medicine and
neuroscience, a reader of capacity cases at the turn of the twentieth century
would find courts relying on narrative facts much more frequently than they do
today. And while this earlier capacity litigation was not perfect, courts’ reliance

124. 49 P.3d 415 (Kan. 2002).
125. Id. at 420.
126. Id. at 427, 429.
127. Id. at 429.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 420.
130. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR (telling the story of a man who
disinherited one of his three daughters for failing to properly express her love for him).
131. See, e.g., In re Koll’s Estate, 206 N.W. 40, 42 (Iowa 1925) (“To constitute senile dementia in
such legal sense as to deprive one of testamentary capacity, there must be such failure of the mind as
to deprive [an individual] of intelligent action.”). See generally SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE
(2016) [hereinafter BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND] (charting the development of the
doctrine of capacity over the nineteenth century).
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on narrative facts, rather than cognitive evidence, resulted in a more consistent,
coherent, and defensible body of cases than today’s.
For example, in the 1915 case Wisner v. Chandler,132 the Kansas Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a man, who “by the time of his death
had totally lost his mind,”133 possessed sufficient mental capacity to execute a
will unfavorable to his son Charles.134 The court reversed a lower court finding,
holding that “the facts . . . establish to a moral and legal certainty capacity.”135
In so doing, it did not rely on medical testimony or facts about the decedent’s
cognitive function.136 Instead, the court looked to the story and character of the
decedent—a story about a man whose sons, the product of a second marriage,
did not get along with his third wife (“Mrs. Wisner”)—and found the decision
to exclude Charles to follow from this story:
Charles and his stepmother sometimes quarreled. While their relations
were not severed, and remained cordial and ordinarily affectionate, he
sometimes used to her and of her language profane, unkind, and in a few
instances, cruel. . . . Charles denied the defamation, but lack of proper
respect for Mrs. Wisner, extending to cruelty, on the part of Charles,
was expressly found by the court. . . . However much it may be regretted
that the testator could not forgive, as Mrs. Wisner probably did, his
resentment was human and natural.137
Capacity cases analyzing the relationship of a decision to the individual’s
life story were quite common,138 and some courts in the late-nineteenth century
viewed their task in these cases as requiring an understanding of the individual’s
life story.139 Moreover, courts through the first half of the twentieth century
betrayed a frank recognition of the challenging normative questions of the
capacity doctrine that medicine was ill-equipped to answer on its own.140
Indeed, in Wisner, the court noted that science “has done but little more than
give a name to the retrograde metamorphosis of the brain which causes . . .
132. 147 P. 849 (Kan.).
133. Id. at 851.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 850.
136. Id. at 851.
137. Id. at 854.
138. See, e.g., In re Koll’s Estate, 206 N.W. 40, 42 (Iowa 1925); In re Kimberly, 36 A. 847, 847–48
(Conn. 1896); Woodville v. Woodville, 60 S.E. 140, 142 (W. Va. 1908).
139. See In re Forman’s Will, 54 Barb. 274, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869) (“Mr. Forman appears to
have been at the time of his marriage, and to have continued to be, a common-place, cool, complacent,
calculating, circumspect man, without vices.”); see also 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, MORETON STILLÉ,
ROBERT AMORY & EDWARD STICKNEY, WHARTON AND STILLÉ’S MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 329
(4th ed. 1882) (“To penetrate the mask of Hamlet’s madness . . . it is necessary to understand Hamlet’s
history.”).
140. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Atkins, 162 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ark. 1942) (“Perhaps no branch of
jurisprudence is more tenuous or spectral than that dealing with one’s mental capacity to contract.”).
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senility.”141 Similarly, in the 1944 case In re Provolt’s Estate,142 the Oregon
Supreme Court observed that
[i]t is extremely difficult to determine just at what stage in the progress
of senile dementia the mind is incapable of functioning intelligently. The
line of demarcation between sanity and insanity is often as indistinct and
uncertain as that between twilight and darkness. It is a question upon
which medical experts have often disagreed.143
This earlier narrative reasoning was not the result of a materially different
doctrinal formulation—the doctrine has always purported to be based in
contemporaneous cognitive functioning.144 But the quacks of the age aside,145
courts simply did not have the tools to meaningfully measure cognitive
mechanics in the way we do today. Over the course of the twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, as we’ve developed brain scans, biomarkers, and batteries
for cognitive functioning, this has changed. Indeed, today, courts rarely resolve
capacity challenges with reference to facts other than medical testimony.146 In
many ways, then, the capacity doctrine of the last century did not suffer from
some of the shortcomings of the current one. We can read these cases with
relative confidence in their outcomes because we see the courts wrestle with the
stories presented by the parties and watch them adjudicate between them.
But this earlier doctrine was not perfectly applied. As Professor Susannah
Blumenthal has documented, courts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries struggled profoundly with capacity, how to measure it, and what it
meant to have the threshold level of cognition required for democratic
citizenship.147 Judges had a doctrine of capacity that aspired to measure
cognition but a medical profession that was not meaningfully able to do so.

141. Wisner, 147 P. at 852.
142. 151 P.2d 736 (Or.).
143. Id. at 737.
144. See In re Koll’s Estate, 206 N.W. 40, 42 (Iowa 1925).
145. See, e.g., BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 131, at 2 (“[I]t was not
unusual for each party to enter the courtroom flanked by medical experts and an army of lay witnesses
who offered diametrically opposed portraits of the alleged incompetent.”).
146. See, e.g., In re Estate of Washburn, 690 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.H. 1997); In re Cirnigliaro, 2017
WL 6763159, at *4 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 28, 2017) (unpublished table disposition); Wiesman v.
Wiesman, No. 2017AP466, 2018 WL 4943805, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018) (unpublished table
decision); In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 2019).
147. See Susannah L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 1034 (2006) [hereinafter Blumenthal,
The Deviance of the Will] (observing that judges in the Gilded Age “remained committed to the onerous
and time-consuming task of ferreting out the truly meritorious claims”); BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND, supra note 131, at 14 (“These lawsuits provided occasions for airing doubts about
the capacity of citizens to be self-governing and they display the difficulties that participants
encountered in attempting to set the threshold of legal competence.”).
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Moreover, the capacity case law at this time struggled to cast off its
doctrinal roots in substantive moral judgment on private decision-making. In
its origins in Roman law, the capacity doctrine originally made ethical
judgments about the appropriate disposition of property, invalidating
“unnatural” dispositions.148 This made the doctrine fundamentally illiberal.149
And while judges of the early-twentieth century heartily embraced liberalism,
“the ‘reasonableness’ of the testator’s disposition remained an important
consideration in borderline cases.”150 For example, in the 1904 case Hamon v.
Hamon,151 the Missouri Supreme Court noted that “if a man over 80 years of
age should express a desire to marry . . . and have a wife to take care of him in
his old days, it was no symptom of senile dementia,” because “[c]ommon sense
is not indebted to science for knowledge of that fact.”152 We can speculate that
the court may not have been so indulgent if the genders were reversed.
From this perspective, the medicalization of the capacity doctrine over the
course of the twentieth century accomplished some valuable things. It brought
capacity litigation closer in line with its normative foundations and helped make
the cases more agnostic to the content of the decision. But by purging narrative
facts from consideration, this development—an instance more of science
catching up to the aspirations of law than of change in the law—has resulted in
case law today that is in many ways more incoherent and inconsistent than it
was a century ago.
The problem with the older capacity cases was not their inability to
measure what they wanted, it was their desire to measure the wrong thing. In
order to make sense of the way in which courts clearly felt they should resolve
these cases, judges would have had to notice the philosophical confusion
underneath the doctrine. And to develop a doctrine that resolved that confusion
in a way morally agnostic to the content of decisions, they would have needed
a rigorous theory of personal identity. Early twentieth-century judges lacked
the philosophical tools, not just the scientific ones, to make these
interventions.153 Instead, as medical developments that fit cleanly into the
148. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 36, at 167–68. The civil law continues
to take substantive ethical positions, barring disinheritance of children except for specified reasons. See,
e.g., Adam F. Streisand & Lena G. Streisand, Conflicts of International Inheritance Laws in the Age of
Multinational Lives, 52 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 701–05 (2020).
149. See, e.g., James Toomey, Constitutionalizing Nature’s Law: Dignity and the Regulation of
Biotechnology in Switzerland, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020) (“[W]hat distinguishes a liberal state
from others is that it is agnostic to its citizens’ theories of the good life.”). See generally JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (describing political liberalism from a philosophical lens).
150. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will, supra note 147, at 1034.
151. 79 S.W. 422 (Mo.).
152. Id. at 426.
153. The narrative theory of personal identity was not fully articulated until Marya Schechtman’s
1996 book The Constitution of Selves. See generally SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22 (articulating a narrative
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doctrine became available, courts eagerly relied on them and lost reference to
the kinds of facts that they had incidentally sought as a proxy—the narrative
facts that really always mattered. In the next part, I hope to offer the
philosophical basis for a doctrine of capacity grounded in these narrative facts—
a doctrine based in a narrative theory of personal identity.
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF CAPACITY
Capacity litigation offers the court two prima facie plausible stories. The
normative consequences of each story are straightforward—in one, a story of
what we might think of as “ordinary” change, the court should respect the
decision, and in the other, about the fading or disruption of an individual, it
should not. This part dives into that distinction, analyzing what is different
between the two stories. In philosophical terms, the difference is that in one the
individual’s personal identity—that which makes us the same person across
time—has been disrupted by a breach of narrative continuity, whereas in the
other it has not. This way of thinking about the problem is distinct from the
law’s, which is rooted in the philosophical construct of personhood—that which
makes us a person at all—understood as a measure of cognitive function.
After laying out the philosophical stakes of the capacity doctrine, I argue
that its reliance on cognitive personhood rather than narrative personal identity
is misplaced. Indeed, what matters to private-law decision-making is personal
identity, not personhood. Moreover, there is substantial evidence in
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and literary theory that personal
identity is constituted of narrative coherence.
A.

Situating Capacity Litigation in Philosophy

This section analyzes capacity litigation through the lens of philosophy.
First, it abstracts from the prima facie plausible stories presented to the court
in a capacity case and finds that the essential distinction between the two stories
is that in one the individual’s personal identity, understood as the continuity of
their story, has been disrupted, and in the other it has not. I then explain the
theory of personal identity). This work built on an explosion of interest in narrative, particularly in
psychology, in the 1980s. See generally, e.g., JEROME S. BRUNER, IN SEARCH OF MIND: ESSAYS IN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1984) (outlining a psychological theory of mind grounded in narrativization); DAN
P. MCADAMS, POWER, INTIMACY, AND THE LIFE STORY: PERSONOLOGICAL INQUIRIES INTO
IDENTITY (1985) (emphasizing the identity-constituting function of life story); RICOEUR, supra note
22 (outlining a philosophical theory of narrative); MACINTYRE, supra note 22 (focusing on the
philosophical theory of narrative’s application to ethics). Schechtman’s work engaged with the modern
analytical debates on the nature of metaphysical identity from the mid-century. See SCHECHTMAN,
supra note 22, at 2 (situating the narrative theory of personal identity in debates about the nature of
personal identity in analytical philosophy); NOONAN, supra note 21 (reproducing seminal articles in
the debate on the nature of personal identity from analytical philosophers such as Barnard Williams,
Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker).
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philosophical theory that accounts for this distinction—a narrative theory of
personal identity. Finally, I contrast this theory with the philosophical basis of
the current doctrine—a cognitive theory of personhood.
1. Capacity Litigation in the Abstract
In capacity cases—like those of Charles Thrash, Clara Marsh, and many
more—the opposing parties each offer the court an alternative story, the
narrative structures of which are essentially consistent. Indeed, at a certain level
of abstraction, the facts of these competing stories are the same. Let us suppose
the following skeleton of stipulated sequential facts: (T1) Jane Doe has
maintained for some time a particular view with respect to Decision X (whether,
for example, she would ever sell the family home or to whom she intends to
leave the estate); (T2) Jane’s cognitive abilities undergo some changes; (T3) after
those changes, Jane changes her view on Decision X.
From these agreed-upon facts, the adversarial parties tell two different
stories. The first one, call it S1, explains T3 as a result of T2—that is, it explains
the change in decision as the causal product of cognitive changes. S1 is a story
about the awesome and frightening power of mental decay. In contrast, the
other story, S2, tells us that Jane reached T3 by some means other than the causal
power of cognitive change at T2. This process can take myriad forms, but we
recognize those forms as a coherent narrative of Jane, and we understand that
there is something privileged about their form. S2 is a story of love or hate,
alienation or reconciliation, hope or fear, loneliness or yearning, or all of these.
Let us agree that in S1 the law may decline to recognize decisions at T3.154 But
in S2 the law has no such discretion. The obligation of private law there—with
Jane Doe as with the rest of us—is to recognize and enforce her wishes.
To illustrate the essential difference between S1 and S2, we must make
some further assumptions. First, let’s assume the same levels of mechanical
cognitive function. In other words, whether we are in S1 or S2, Jane Doe receives
the same scores on cognitive tests at each stage. This assumption is necessary
to tease out whether what really distinguishes the two stories is the extent of
cognitive decline; that is, whether our normative intuitions in the story of
ordinary change (S2) versus the story of incoherent decline (S1) are driven by
the fact that we assume a greater level of cognitive decay at T2 in S1. But the
normative distinction between the stories survives this assumption of equal
154. Some scholars have challenged that, in the healthcare context, the law has the right to override
the present, experientially-rooted wishes of individuals with dementia. See generally Rebecca Dresser,
Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L.
REV. 373 (1986) (challenging the doctrine of enforcing advance healthcare directives over the present
objections of an individual with dementia). As discussed infra note 193, however, this objection may
turn on disagreement about the identity-dependent nature of healthcare rights. In contrast, the privatelaw rights of property and contract are strongly identity-dependent. See infra Section II.B.
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cognitive functioning. We feel as solicitous of a genuine love story involving an
individual with cognitive impairments as we do in general.155 People at a wide
range of cognitive functioning—both among the healthy population and among
the population suffering from various levels of deviation from their lifelong
baseline—fall in love, change their minds, encounter new arguments and
experiences, and make changes in their values, relationships, and goals.156 In its
refrain that there is no particular diagnosis that vitiates capacity,157 the doctrine
already, to a limited extent, seems to recognize that it is not only particular
diseases that matter in whether the law should intervene.
Next, we must cut third parties from the equation and assume good faith.
Of course, in many real-life circumstances, S1 is not merely a story about the
power of cognitive decline but is also a story of manipulation or abuse, of a bad
actor taking advantage of a vulnerable individual. Assuming away third parties
addresses the possibility that our real concern in the difference between S1 and
S2 is a response to the bad behavior of a third party that we may suspect is
present in S1 but not S2, where the story is one of decay, not ordinary change.
But the distinction between the stories survives this assumption as well. The
law should not recognize decisions in S1—decisions that are caused by a mental
disease—regardless of whether they were brought about by the manipulation of
a third party. Indeed, the doctrine already recognizes that third-party influence
is not dispositive of capacity. Private law treats “capacity,” which is the
threshold prerequisite to legal decision-making, and “undue influence,” which
invalidates certain decisions brought about by the manipulation of third parties,
as distinct legal forms.158 Decisions made without capacity are not recognized
whether or not they were the result of manipulation by a third party.159 In other
words, if undue influence were all that mattered in this context, the capacity
doctrine would not exist.

155. See, e.g., Ellen McCarthy, When Bill Met Shelley: No Disability Could Keep Them Apart,
WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/liveblog/wp/2013/02/07/whenbill-met-shelley-no-disability-could-keep-them-apart/ [https://perma.cc/9NQ7-CGXD (dark archive)]
(describing the love story of a couple both of whom have intellectual disabilities, including Down
syndrome).
156. See, e.g., Deirdre Fetherstonhaugh, Laura Tarzia, Michael Bauer, Rhonda Nay & Elizabeth
Beattie, “The Red Dress or the Blue?” How Do Staff Perceive That They Support Decision Making for People
with Dementia Living in Residential Aged Care Facilities?, 35 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 209, 210 (2016)
(“From this literature, it is clear that people with dementia can and do make decisions, and wish to
remain involved in decision making for as long as possible.”); Jaworska, supra note 18, at 107 (relating
an anecdote involving a man with moderate dementia who is able to care for himself and purchases the
car he has always wanted).
157. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schlueter, 994 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 2000) (holding a diagnosis of
senile dementia is not incompatible with a finding of testamentary capacity).
158. See supra note 36.
159. Id.
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By making these two assumptions, we know that the distinction between
S1 and S2 is not contingent on Jane-in-S1 being subject to greater cognitive
decline than Jane-in-S2, nor is it that Jane-in-S1 is a victim of another’s
malfeasance. But in S1 the court has a role and in S2 it does not. What, then, is
the distinction? The best candidate remaining is a claim about Jane, not her
biology, but her identity, her Jane-ness. The distinction is what we mean by the
colloquialism that it was not the real Jane who made the decision in S1, or that
Jane didn’t really make the decision. What matters in the difference between S1
and S2 is whether Jane at T3 is the same Jane we know and love.
Moreover, the distinction between S1 and S2 turns on something about
Jane’s story—it turns on whether that story is, in fact, nonsense or a coherent,
continuous story of Jane, a story of love and the ordinary things. Indeed, the
way in which we distinguish S1 from S2 is to establish certain facts that tell us
more about the story (that is, certain narratively significant facts) about what
happened between T1 and T2 and T3. It is about whether Jane grew to hate her
house now that it was empty—a story about herself that she could tell us—or
whether the story of her has been interrupted—a fact that makes her a story
impossible to follow. In short, this abstraction tells us that what matters in
distinguishing S1 from S2 is whether Jane Doe at T3 is the same Jane Doe as she
was at T1, a question we answer by looking to facts about her story.
2. The Philosophy of Narrative Personal Identity
Philosophers have long sought to answer the question of what makes
someone at T2 (or T3, in our case) the same person that they were at T1.160 In the
philosophical literature, this is referred to as the question of personal identity.161
This literature seeks to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of
what makes someone the same person that they had been previously.162 Thus,
in the language of philosophy, the distinction between S1 and S2 is one of
personal identity.
The modern philosophical interrogation of the nature of personal identity
began with John Locke, who posited that personal identity is constituted of the
continuity of “consciousness,” which has been widely understood to mean the
continuity of memory.163 The field today is largely divided between partisans of
160. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF
LIFE 5 (2002) (“[W]e must determine what is necessarily involved in our continuing to exist over
time . . . . This is what is known as the problem of personal identity.”).
161. See id.; see also Daniel Kolak, Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity,
162 SYNTHESE 341, 370 (2008).
162. See, e.g., SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 2; David W. Shoemaker, Personal Identity and
Practical Concerns, 116 MIND 462, 462 (2007).
163. See Sydney Shoemaker, Persons, Animals, and Identity, 162 SYNTHESE 313, 314 (2008) (“[T]he
history of the topic of personal identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke.”). See generally Jessica
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“Neo-Lockean” views, who argue that the necessary conditions of personal
identity have something to do with psychological continuity, and a robust group
of dissenters who argue that the only necessary and sufficient condition of
personal identity is the biological continuity of a human body (regardless of
psychological continuity).164 To illustrate the difference between these theories,
consider the case of an individual who has undergone total amnesia since
committing a crime. Neo-Lockeans would hold that they are now a different
person and cannot be punished; bodily continuity theorists say that they are the
same person and should be.
Neither of these theories obviously accounts for the difference between S1
and S2. In determining whether we are living in S1 or S2, we do not ask how much
memory was lost at T2 (necessarily, in the extent to which the distinction
survives the assumption of identical cognitive functioning), nor whether Jane
has (obviously) remained constituted of the same body. Instead, we make our
determination about identity by looking to narrative facts—facts about
causation, the relationships of characters, and human agency—about Jane
between T1 and T3.
In recent decades, a growing group of philosophers has outlined and
argued for a narrative theory of personal identity.165 These theorists posit that
“a person creates his identity by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story
of his life”;166 “[o]n this view, a person’s identity . . . is constituted by the content
of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and experiences included in it are,
by virtue of that inclusion, hers.”167 Many philosophers have endorsed this view.
For example, Charles Taylor argued that “grasp[ing] our lives in a narrative” is
a “basic condition of making sense of ourselves”;168 Alasdair MacIntyre that
“personal identity is just that identity presupposed by the unity of the character
which the unity of a narrative requires”;169 and Daniel Dennett that the “story
[of] our autobiography” acts as the “center of gravity” of the self.170
In defense of this narrative theory, philosopher Marya Schechtman has
argued that the prevailing non-narrative theories of personal identity are

Gordon-Roth, Locke on Personal Identity, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-personal-identity/ [https://perma.cc/VH53-C6MY] (explaining that
Locke’s discussion of personal identity “ignited a heated debate over” the topic).
164. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 13 (summarizing the psychological and bodily continuity
theories).
165. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
166. SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 93.
167. Id. at 94.
168. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 47
(1989).
169. MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 218.
170. Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity, in SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS:
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 103, 114 (Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole & Dale Johnson eds., 1991).
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preoccupied with answering the wrong question.171 She argues that when we talk
about personal identity, there are at least two distinct things we may be
referring to: (1) the “logical relation of identity,” of “what makes a person at
time t2 the same person as a person at time t1” (the “reidentification question”),
and (2) the “practical importance of personal identity,” or “which beliefs, values,
desires, and other psychological features make someone the person she is” (the
“characterization question”).172 The former is a metaphysical question173 but
struggles to explain its significance to the ethical questions for which we look
to a theory of personal identity for answers. Instead, it primarily resolves
thought experiments involving teleportation, duplication, and brain-splitting
(or, as above, rare cases of total amnesia), all of which are of little practical
importance.174 Indeed, some prominent philosophers, after painstakingly laying
out a metaphysical theory of personal identity, have found themselves forced to
proclaim that personal identity is not of ethical significance at all.175
In contrast, Schechtman directly tackles the characterization question,
which is one of primary ethical significance having to do with the concerns from
which private law’s interest in personal identity arises—the survival of the self,
the allocation of moral responsibility, and compensation for previously made
decisions.176 In her effort to directly answer these questions, Schechtman arrives
at the theory that “an autobiographical narrative,” a “story of [a] life,”
constitutes personal identity in the ethically relevant sense.177 From this
perspective, an individual’s personal identity remains continuous so long as it
continues to build a story of themself; it is disrupted where their choices cease
to make a story.178 Schechtman’s theory includes both objective and subjective

171. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 1 (“Most modern personal identity theorists, I charge,
conflate two significantly different questions.”).
172. Id. at 1–2.
173. See id. at 7 (“The general problem [of identity] is the metaphysical question of how a single
entity persists through change.”).
174. See id. at 1 (“[D]ebates about personal identity have become so far removed from the concerns
that originally impelled them that it seems as if something more must be amiss in this case.”).
175. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 217 (1984) (“Personal identity is not what
matters.”); see also SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 1 (“[I]t has been notoriously difficult for any of
the views of identity currently in vogue to explain why personal identity matters to us at all.”).
Whatever the merits of the view that personal identity is not of essential ethical concern, it is not
compatible with private law’s assumption that personal identity is significant. See infra Section II.B.
176. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 2 (“There is a strong pre-philosophical sense that facts
about identity underlie facts about four basic features of personal existence: survival, moral
responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation.”).
177. Id. at 93.
178. Id. at 148 (“The important element in [late-stage Alzheimer’s] cases, however, is the loss of
narrative capacity, and even though such an individual may have memories of long ago, he cannot
integrate these with anything else, or have any kind of coherent sense of himself as an extended
subject.”).
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criteria; it requires both the subjective experience of narrative sense and the
objective coherence of that story.179
This theory explains what matters in the distinction between S1 and S2. It
explains why the difference between these two stories is whether Jane Doe at
T3 is the same Jane Doe we have always known (or, another way of thinking
about the same point, that the decision at T3 is not really made by Jane Doe),
and why we feel this question can be answered with reference to narrative facts
and conclusions about the story. In other words, the distinction between S1 and
S2 is rooted in a narrative theory of personal identity—when Jane Doe’s
narrative identity has been disrupted by disease, we are in S1 and the law ought
to intervene, and when it has not been, we are in S2 and the law ought to stay
out.
3. The Philosophy of Cognitive Personhood
The capacity doctrine is not grounded in narrative personal identity—it
does not adjudicate between S1 and S2. Indeed, it is not based on personal
identity at all. Rather than ask whether Jane is still Jane when she made the
decision, the court asks whether, as an absolute matter, Jane has the cognitive
functioning required to exercise the relevant private-law right at T3. This
analytical posture can also be understood in the language of philosophy—the
doctrine of capacity is grounded in a cognitive theory of personhood.
In ethical philosophy, a person is an entity entitled to the full suite of rights
recognized in ethics and law.180 Contemporary analytical philosophers generally
do not think of personhood as a freestanding ontological category, but rather as
a metaphysical conclusion about an entity based on the presence or absence of
certain capacities at a particular time—that is, anything—a space alien, an AI, an
exceptional orangutan—can be or not be a person at T3, so long as it possesses
the capacities that are the necessary conditions of personhood.181 A theory of
personhood tells us what those necessary conditions are.

179. Id. at 95.
180. See, e.g., TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, supra note 19, at 97 (“A person is a
being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights.”); see also TOMASZ PIETRZYKOWSKI,
PERSONHOOD BEYOND HUMANISM: ANIMALS, CHIMERAS, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND THE
LAW 7 (2018) (“[A] person in law is an entity that can be ascribed certain rights and duties.”).
181. See, e.g., TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, supra note 19, at 97 (“[U]nderlying
the moral status [of personhood], as its condition, are certain capacities.”). This is the prevailing
position in philosophy, although, to be sure, some philosophers defend “speciesist” accounts that limit
personhood to homo sapiens. ROBERT SPAEMANN, PERSONS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
‘SOMEONE’ AND ‘SOMETHING’ 247 (Oliver O’Donovan trans., 2006) (“There can, and must, be one
criterion for personality, and one only; that is biological membership of the human race.”).
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There are many theories about the necessary conditions of personhood,
which is among the most contested issues in philosophy.182 But setting aside the
details and speaking generally, the capacities thought to underlie personhood
are “usually cognitive.”183 Under these prevailing cognitive theories of personhood,
personhood is a metaphysical conclusion about an entity based on the presence
or absence of a certain suite of cognitive abilities at a certain level of
functionality.184
A cognitive theory of personhood explains the capacity doctrine’s
analytical posture—both the variables it measures and the practical
consequences it adjudicates. Of course, the law does not, in so many words,
describe a challenge to legal capacity as a challenge to personhood (and,
moreover, a capacity ruling with respect to a decision or a class of decisions does
not deprive an individual of legal personhood generally; guardianship, though,
is a different story). But a legal conclusion of capacity is based on the same
variables as a metaphysical conclusion of personhood under cognitive theories—
namely, absolute, momentary cognitive functioning. And these conclusions
have similar ethical stakes—access to or deprivation of the protections of law at
a particular point in time.
Although grounded in the same variables, however, the legal doctrine
demands greater levels of cognitive functioning than theories of personhood
would generally require on their own. As discussed above,185 the legal tests
demand an individual be able to understand the nature and consequences of the
particular decision and in some circumstances the “natural objects of their
bounty.”186 This is a much more demanding test of cognitive functioning than
prevailing theories of personhood, which make weaker claims about the levels
of cognitive functioning that entitle an individual to the highest levels of moral
concern. For example, Immanuel Kant’s theory requires only the ability to
reason187 and John Stuart Mill’s theory, the ability to reason and feel.188 In other
words, the cognitive threshold of legal capacity is higher than the threshold of
182. See Edmund L. Erde, Personhood: The Vain and Pointless Quest for a Definition, in PERSONHOOD
supra note 19, at 71 (asserting that defining “personhood” has been “the guiding
question in philosophy since Socrates”).
183. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 59–60.
184. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35–40
(James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (defining rationality as the capacity required for personhood);
Samuel Dale, Personhood, Critical Interests, and the Moral Imperative of Advance Directives in Alzheimer’s
Cases, VOICES BIOETHICS, Jan. 2021, at 1, 4 (suggesting Mill required both rational and affective
capacities to “maximize[] their holistic goods, not only the sum of their experience of pleasure and
pain”); John Harris, The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life, 9 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 293,
307 (1999) (arguing that the relevant capacity is the capacity to “valu[e] its own existence”).
185. See supra Section I.A.
186. JORGENSEN, supra note 48, at 49.
187. See KANT, supra note 184, at 28–29.
188. See Dale, supra note 184, at 4.
AND HEALTHCARE,
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philosophical personhood under most theories. The doctrine of capacity is not,
then, coterminous with personhood. But by determining access to decisionmaking rights based on the results of cognitive testing, the doctrine of capacity
is grounded in a cognitive theory of personhood.189
The constructs of personhood and personal identity are conceptually
related. This is because to be the same person one was, one must be a person;
personhood is ontologically prior to personal identity, and personal identity
assumes personhood.190 Because personhood is necessary but not sufficient to
establish personal identity, cognitive testing will have a role in a doctrine
grounded in personal identity, discussed at greater length below.191
Moreover, although they are related, the philosophy of personhood is
distinct from the philosophy of personal identity—it is a different inquiry to ask
whether an entity is currently entitled to a certain level of moral concern than it
is to ask whether that entity is qualitatively the same as it was at another time.192
It is not the case, then, that the doctrine’s apathy towards narrative facts is
simply the result of disagreement about the content of the metaphysical category
of personhood.193 Instead, it is a disjuncture about the appropriate category to
be analyzing: we ought to look to personal identity; the doctrine tells us to look
to personhood. This misalignment is the fundamental error of the capacity
doctrine.
B.

Personal Identity and the Private Law

The fundamental philosophical error of the capacity doctrine is that it is
grounded in a cognitive theory of personhood where it should be grounded in a
narrative theory of personal identity. This claim has two steps. The first is that
personal identity, not personhood, is the appropriate philosophical category

189. Consider, perhaps, an analogy to the way in which legal philosopher Adolf Reinach argues
that positive private law is grounded in various ontological categories but not coterminous with them.
See ADOLF REINACH, THE APRIORI FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW 131 (John F. Crosby trans.,
2021).
190. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 160, at 5.
191. See infra Section III.C.
192. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 160, at 5 (stressing that the inquiry of “what is necessarily
involved in our being or remaining persons” may be different than that of “our continuing to exist”);
see also Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 93, 128
(2011) (observing that “Professor Radin’s example of the home as property for personhood equates
personhood with personal identity”).
193. Some philosophers and scholars have argued, in effect, that one of the capacities underlying
personhood is the capacity for continuity or personal identity. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 963 (1982) (“Another classical view of the person makes its
essential attributes self-consciousness and memory.”). But while this view may make conclusions about
personhood and personal identity coterminous as a practical matter, personhood and personal identity
are analytically and metaphysically distinct concepts. See supra text accompanying note 192.
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through which to adjudicate access to private law. The second is that the content
of personal identity is narrative.
This section evaluates the first claim. It argues that personal identity is
what matters for two reasons. First, as a matter of substantive doctrine, the
private-law fields in which capacity is implicated are concerned with personal
identity. Second, the core normative commitment of private law is to promote
human flourishing through private ordering; a basic commitment to facilitating
private aspirations, desires, intuitions, and impulses. And my recent empirical
research suggests that seniors, the population that most frequently interacts
with the capacity doctrine, think personal identity is what matters in this
context.
1. Substantive Private Law and Personal Identity
There are two essential bodies of private law that we have been analyzing
in this Article—contracts and property.194 After all, marriage law is a kind of
contract law195 that implicates property law.196 Estate law, similarly, is a
subsidiary of property law.197 Finally, trusts occupy an ambiguous position
between the doctrines of property and contract.198

194. The doctrine of capacity does not play a similar thresholding role in tort law. See, e.g., Harry
J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“A
mentally disabled tort defendant is held to that requisite standard of care without regard to the
disability’s effect on his ability to comply.”).
195. See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Breaking Down Status, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 671, 683–
84 (2021); Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6
UNBOUND 1, 18 (2010) (observing that marriage is “permeated by contract”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1233–34 (1998) (collecting
scholarship on marriage law as contract law).
196. See, e.g., Charlotte K. Goldberg, Opting In, Opting Out: Autonomy in the Community Property
States, 72 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011). It is possible that not all rights are as identity-dependent in the
relevant respect as those of contract and property. In particular, it is possible that the right to choose
whether to live or die is not identity-dependent and turns only on whether the entity deciding is a
person. This could justify a standard of capacity based in personhood for some kinds of decisions, such
as healthcare decisions. This Article is concerned with capacity in private law, where it interfaces
directly with identity-dependent substantive doctrines.
197. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“Even the United States concedes that
total abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional.”); Emily
Hoenig, Why Can’t We All Just Cher?: Drag Celebrity Impersonators Versus an Ever-Expanding Right of
Publicity, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 537, 543 n.28 (2020) (“[T]he right of testamentary
disposition is essential to the idea of private property.”).
198. See, e.g., Allison Anna Tait, Keeping Promises and Meeting Needs: Public Charities at a Crossroads,
102 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1792 (2018) (“[T]rust law has roots in both contract and property.”); Robert
H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 628 (2004) (“Trust law is
most frequently classified as a species of property law.”); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of
the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995) (“Trusts are contracts.”).
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Contract law is, at its core, preoccupied with personal identity.199 It is
fundamentally committed to holding persons in the future to promises that they
make now (or holding persons now to promises they made in the past).200 After
all, the only person bound by a contract is the one who made it.201 When we ask
whether a contract can be enforced against a particular person, our primary
concern is whether that person is the one who entered into the contract, not
whether they are a person at all.202 Indeed, it is never enough in contract law to
simply ask whether the individual entering into or enforcing a contract is a
person. We must also ask whether they are the same person as they were at some
other time. Imagine, for instance, that I enter into a contract to deliver 8,000
widgets next year. In the meantime, suppose I’m killed and replaced by an
imposter. The imposter would not be bound to deliver 8,000 widgets. He is a
different person than me, he never agreed to do it, and he was never a party to
the contract. His personhood is immaterial. Although the right to contract is a
right of personhood, rights regarding particular contracts (which is what contract
law is about) are necessarily about personal identity.
Other scholars have noted the essential identity-dependence of contract
law in different ways. For example, Professor Kaiponanea Matsumura analyzed
the use of the contractual defense that the party against whom enforcement is
sought is no longer the same person as they were when they entered into the
contract.203 He noted that a core commitment of contract law is the principle
that “the contracting self” may bind “his future self”204 and that contract law
“generally assumes the existence of a continuous personal identity.”205
Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott,206 Marjorie Maguire Shultz,207
199. See generally Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, supra note 22 (providing background on the
nature of contract law).
200. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 26, at 17 (“[S]ince a contract is first of all a promise, the contract
must be kept because the promise must be kept.”).
201. See, e.g., Mendez v. Hampton Ct. Nursing Ctr., LLC, 203 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2016) (“The
third-party beneficiary doctrine does not permit two parties to bind a third—without the third party’s
agreement . . . .”).
202. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Mondy, 936 So. 2d 35, 38–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding
erroneous admission of evidence purporting to show that the defendant was the same person as the one
who had entered into the contract was not harmless); cf. Shay v. Aldrich, 790 N.W.2d 629, 659 (Mich.
2010) (noting that individuals who are not the same person that agreed to the contract may only sue to
enforce it where they “stand[] in the shoes of the original promisee”).
203. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, supra note 22, at 102–20.
204. Id. at 75.
205. Id. at 81.
206. Scott & Scott, supra note 195, at 1247 (describing as “the very essence of contract” the
proposition that courts will enforce a contract against the same person that entered into it
notwithstanding their present regret).
207. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 204, 214 (1982) (arguing that the sine qua non of contractual private ordering is that
“yesterday’s legally binding private choice overrides today’s contrary private choice” by the same
person).
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Gregory Klass,208 Richard Posner,209 and Allan Farnsworth210 have also observed
the way in which contractual enforcement relies on an implicit claim of personal
identity.
Property, too, is an identity-dependent right.211 As I’ve recently explained
at greater length elsewhere,212 this is because when we consider whether an
individual may exercise a particular property right—say, to dispose of property
by will—we must ask not only whether the decision maker is a person but
whether they are the person that owns the particular piece of property.213 And
whether an individual owns a particular piece of property is primarily a question
of personal identity—whether the claimed owner is the same person that
purchased or was given the property at some prior time.214 That is, if I own a
home and am murdered in it, my murderer has no claim to my home, despite
being a person, and being inside it. He is not me, and it is not his. This identitydependence can be further seen in the law of adverse possession, under which a
given individual’s possession of property must be continuous for the statutory
period of time in order for an ownership interest to perfect.215 If the identity of
the individual possessing property against the true owner is interrupted during
that time, the adverse possession clock resets (absent privity, which in many
ways is an artificial legal identity).216 In other words, as with contract law, while
208. Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1726, 1727 (2008) (describing contract law as “an act of self-legislation in which the parties create new
legal obligations for themselves” (emphasis added)).
209. Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3
LEGAL THEORY 23 (1997).
210. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS
26 (1998) (observing that the argument that a “person may evolve into a ‘later self’” and thereby avoid
contractual enforcement “has had no significant impact on courts”).
211. See James Toomey, “As Long as I’m Me”: From Personhood to Personal Identity in Dementia and
Decision-Making, 4 CANADIAN J. BIOETHICS 57, 62–64 (2021).
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Why the Ability-To-Repay Rule Is Vital to
Financial Stability, 108 GEO. L.J. 649, 659 (2020) (“[I]nvestors cannot sell homes that they do not
own.”); Miriam A. Cherry, A Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”: Using a Disputed Dinosaur To Teach
Contract Defenses, 81 N.D. L. REV. 295, 306 (2005) (describing as a “fundamental property and contract
law principle” that “in general, you cannot sell what you do not own”); see also Moore & Co. v.
Robinson, 62 Ala. 537, 543 (1878) (“Mr. Benjamin, in his excellent book on sales of personal property,
says: ‘In general, no man can sell goods, and convey a valid title to them, unless he be the owner, or
lawfully represent the owner. Nemo dat, quod non habit.’” (quoting J.P. BENJAMIN, BENJAMIN’S
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6 (1868))).
214. See, e.g., Kerby v. Ogletree, 313 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958) (describing the
dispositive question for establishing present ownership by chain of title as whether “S.H. Wills and
S.H. Wells were one and the same person”).
215. See, e.g., 3 AM. JUR. 2D ADVERSE POSSESSION § 9 (2021).
216. See id. § 80 (“An interruption of the continuity of possession of the adverse claimant will cease
the running of the prescribed period for a claim of adverse possession.”); id. § 72 (“[S]uccessive
possessions cannot be tacked for the purpose of showing a continuous adverse possession in the absence
of privity of estate or a connection between the successive occupants.”).
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the right to own property in general may be incident to personhood, the question
of whether a particular individual may exercise a property right with respect to a
particular piece of property is always a question of personal identity.
Further, in a seminal article,217 Professor Margaret Jane Radin illustrated
the essential identity-dependence of property law in the extent to which
property itself can facilitate the construction of personal identity: “Most people
possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects
are . . . part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities
in the world.”218
Thus, because the substantive doctrines of private law are concerned with
the exercise of identity-dependent rights, the threshold doctrine of capacity
should be grounded in the philosophical construct of personal identity.
2. Human Flourishing, Private Ordering, and Personal Identity
Moreover, an understanding of capacity as rooted in personal identity is
consistent with the underlying normative aspirations of private law. Private law,
and in particular the law of contracts and property, exists to facilitate human
flourishing through private ordering, and is based on the normative
presumption that it is generally best to permit people to make decisions for
themselves.219 From this perspective, presumptions of law ought to reflect
widespread intuitions.220
The law’s understanding of decision-making capacity as rooted in
cognitive theories of personhood does not reflect widespread intuitions.
Instead, my recent empirical work suggests that most seniors—perhaps
something approaching a consensus of seniors—think of the question of when
the law should intervene in their decision-making in terms of personal
identity.221 Indeed, many seniors “describe[] the point at which they would no

217. Jones, supra note 192, at 94 (listing major citations of Professor Radin’s article).
218. Radin, supra note 193, at 959. Radin refers to this claim as one about personhood rather than
personal identity, but in focusing on the continuity of selves rather than the cognitive preconditions of
being an entity entitled to the highest moral concern, her argument supports the notion that property
is concerned with personal identity, not personhood, as I have defined those terms in this Article.
Professor Jeffrey Douglas Jones has noticed the confusing terminology in this context. See Jones, supra
note 192, at 128 (“I believe Professor Radin’s example of the home as property for personhood equates
personhood with personal identity.”). Radin’s reference to personhood appears to arise from her
reliance on Hegel’s philosophically idiosyncratic use of “personhood.” See Radin, supra note 193, at
971–73.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 26–27; see also HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE
OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 31 (1961) (“Command is slavery; contract is freedom.”); Samuel Williston,
Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 367 (1921) (“[I]t was a corollary of the philosophy of
freedom and individualism that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the obligation of
contract.”).
220. See supra text accompanying note 28.
221. See Toomey, Perspectives of Seniors, supra note 29, at 106.
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longer want to be permitted to make their own decisions as the point at which
they were no longer ‘themselves’ or ‘the same person,’” including saying that
they would not want to be permitted to make decisions when they were
“becoming someone who is not me anymore,” or when they lost the things that
“matter[] in terms of who you are.”222 Ninety-six percent of a study population
of seniors, drawn nationwide from the online database Amazon Mechanical
Turk (n = 235), expressed that they would not want to be permitted to change
their will after losing characteristics that had to do with their sense of life story,
and close analysis of qualitative responses revealed that a near-consensus of the
study population expressed the significance of their personal identity in some
way.223 Therefore, to the extent that private law’s understanding of decisionmaking capacity is motivated by a normative commitment to facilitating
decision-making in patterns of ordinary preferences, it should be based in
personal identity rather than personhood.
Of course, the fact that most people have certain normative intuitions does
not make those intuitions right, nor compel their codification in law.224 But this
limitation on the normative salience of majoritarian moral understandings is
less significant in our design of private law, based on the fundamental premise
of facilitating human flourishing through private ordering, than in other areas
of law. In contrast to, for instance, the criminal law, where exogenous normative
commitments about individual rights and the role of government necessarily
play a role in legal design,225 there is a much broader consensus that the whole
point of private law is to legalize the aspirations of ordinary people.226 If
ordinary people think of the point at which their personal identity is disrupted
as the threshold past which they no longer want their decisions to be recognized
by law, then the doctrine should account for this.
C.

Personal Identity as Narrative Continuity

The final piece of the philosophical puzzle of the doctrine of capacity is
that, in distinguishing between the two prima facie plausible stories before it,
the court would tell us something about the story of the individual decision
222. See id.
223. See Toomey, How To End Our Stories, supra note 29, at 40, 43–51.
224. See, e.g., Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232, 2301 (2020) (“The
larger problem with ‘having criminal law adopt liability and punishment rules that track community
views’ is that community views can be wrong. As previous research amply demonstrates, moral
intuitions can be tribal, short-sighted, and cruel.” (quoting Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal
Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1580 (2017))).
225. See id. (rejecting the argument that criminal law doctrines should necessarily conform to
majoritarian normative intuitions).
226. See RAWLS, supra note 149, at 268 (arguing that the doctrines of private law are “framed to
leave individuals and associations free to act effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive
constraints”).
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maker, something about whether the decision follows from their story or
disrupts it. This is a claim about the content of personal identity—what it means
to maintain a continuous personal identity—specifically, it is the claim that
personal identity is constituted by narrative continuity.
The theories of personal identity that situate identity in self-narrative can
be understood as making two claims—an empirical claim and a normative one.227
The empirical claim is that it is an inherent characteristic of persons228 to
structure ourselves in narrative ways. The normative claim is that this narrative
structure is ethically significant and justifies looking to self-narratives to answer
ethical (and legal) questions, such as whether a decision is entitled to respect in
law. Recent research in a broad range of fields suggests both claims are right.
1. Human Psychology and Life Stories
As for the empirical claim, some have objected to the narrative theory of
personal identity on the ground that narrative is not a universal mechanism for
the organization of thought and, in the case of at least one philosopher, by
claiming not to personally experience his life as a story at all.229 However,
psychology tells us that, in fact, people do generally think of their lives as stories,
and anthropology tells us this phenomenon is universal.
Over the past thirty years, psychological research has shown that “[p]eople
think about their own lives, and the lives of others, in narrative terms, as stories
unfolding over time.”230 Indeed, young children begin to relate experiences as
simple stories between the ages of two and three, coinciding with and connected
to the beginning of development of the concept of the self.231 Throughout

227. Galen Strawson, Against Narrativity, 17 RATIO 428, 428 (2004) (“There is widespread
agreement that human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story of
some sort, or at least as a collection of stories. I’ll call this the psychological Narrativity thesis . . . . The
psychological Narrativity thesis is often coupled with a normative thesis, which I’ll call the ethical
Narrativity thesis.”).
228. As an empirical claim, this is made about the adult human persons that are most
uncontroversially persons. See, e.g., Kittay, supra note 107, at 102 (“We can say that ‘we’ are persons.”).
But the ethical claim justifies extending constructs of personhood and personal identity to entities
capable of narrative formation, and therefore reinforces our preoccupation with the empirical question
of whether humans are inevitably narrative-forming.
229. See Strawson, supra note 227, at 433 (“I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with
form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none.”).
230. Dan P. McAdams, Narrative Identity: What Is It? What Does It Do? How Do You Measure It?,
37 IMAGINATION COGNITION & PERSONALITY 359, 364 (2018).
231. See Monisha Pasupathi & Emma Mansour, Adult Age Differences in Autobiographical Reasoning
in Narratives, 42 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 798, 799 (2006) (“The ability to construct simple stories
about single episodes emerges between 18 months and 3 years, roughly.”); see also Robyn Fivush &
April Schwarzmueller, Children Remember Childhood: Implications for Childhood Amnesia, 12 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 455, 470 (1998) (“[B]etween the ages of 2 and 5 years, there is a gradual
development of narrative skills, and as these skills develop so too do children’s ability to form and
retain enduring autobiographical memories.”).
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childhood and adolescence, storytelling skills develop (coincident with growing
memory-retrieval skills and sense of self),232 and by late adolescence or early
adulthood, people come to think of themselves in terms of a life story,233
through which new events are mediated, understood, and made sense of.234
These stories—and the sense of narrative identity with which they are
associated—continue to develop throughout adult life235 and into old age.236
The empirical phenomenon of human beings thinking in stories and
thinking of themselves as stories is not limited to the contemporary West, and,
indeed, has been found ubiquitously across cultures. For instance, in his seminal
meta-study of human universals, anthropologist Donald Brown found that
narrative is present in every culture that has been studied.237 And many
ethnographies have revealed that individuals across time and culture think of
themselves as stories,238 research that has been corroborated by empirical studies
232. See Elaine Reese, Chen Yan, Fiona Jack & Harlene Hayne, Emerging Identities: Narrative Self
from Early Childhood to Early Adolescence, in NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE:
CREATING THE STORIED SELF 23, 36 (Kate C. McLean & Monisha Pasupathi eds., 2010) (reporting
storytelling insight and the development of autobiographical narratives in a cohort of early
adolescents); Tilmann Habermas & Cybèle de Silveira, The Development of Global Coherence in Life
Narratives Across Adolescence: Temporal, Causal, and Thematic Aspects, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH.
707, 715–17 (2008) (finding a nearly linear progression of the coherence of life stories in cohorts of
eight-, twelve-, sixteen-, and twenty-year-olds).
233. See Py Liv Eriksson, Maria Wängqvist, Johanna Carlsson & Ann Frisén, Identity Development
in Early Adulthood, 56 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 1968, 1979 (2020) (finding the development of
coherent and stable but revisable life stories in young adults); see also Christin Köber, Florian
Schmiedek & Tilman Habermas, Characterizing Lifespan Development of Three Aspects of Coherence in Life
Narratives: A Cohort-Sequential Study, 51 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 260, 267 (2015) (“This first
longitudinal study of the development of the life story supports the theory that global coherence in life
narratives emerges in adolescence.”).
234. See DAN P. MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING
OF THE SELF 37 (1993) [hereinafter MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY] (“Through our personal
myths, we help to create the world we live in, at the same time that it is creating us.”); see also Ewa
Odachowski, Jerzy Trebiński & Monika Prusik, The Impact of Self-Narrative Framing of a Close Person’s
Sudden Death on Coping with the Meaning in Life, 24 J. LOSS & TRAUMA 293, 315 (2019) (finding
narratives to be an effective process by which people make sense of trauma).
235. See Pasupathi & Mansour, supra note 231, at 802 (discussing growth of autobiographical
reasoning and coherence of life stories through middle age).
236. See Kate C. McLean, Stories of the Young and the Old: Personal Continuity & Narrative Identity,
44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 254, 260–61 (2008) (“Interestingly, older adults are also experiencing a
great amount of objective change in terms of physical, cognitive, occupational, and relational
transitions, . . . yet their narratives focused on stability.”); Dan P. McAdams, Ed de St. Aubin &
Regina L. Logan, Generativity Among Young, Midlife, and Older Adults, 8 PSYCH. & AGING 221, 226–27
(1993) (“[O]lder adults show surprisingly high scores on generative commitments and narration . . . .”).
237. See DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 132 (1991) (noting how “universal people”
use narrative “to explain how things came to be and to tell stories”).
238. See, e.g., Amy Bazuin-Yoder, Positive and Negative Childhood and Adolescent Identity Memories
Stemming from One’s Country and Culture-of-Origin: A Comparative Narrative Analysis, 40 CHILD YOUTH
CARE F. 77, 77, 82–88 (2011) (presenting case studies of the development of narrative identity among
Puerto Rican and North Korean immigrants to the western United States and concluding that
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finding consistent patterns of the development of narrative identity in crosscultural populations.239 Moreover, anthropologist and literary scholar Michelle
Scalise Sugiyama has studied the stories told in a variety of cultures and found
universal patterns in their structures.240
Phenomena found universally among human populations are often
thought to have a biological basis,241 and indeed, neuroscientists have recently
found consistent patterns of brain activation when people relate and interpret
personal anecdotes, regardless of the language in which the stories are told,242
and other scientists have located suggestions of the possible origins of narrative
identity in higher apes.243 For these reasons, there is now a broad consensus that
narrative, including a self-conception in narrative form, is a biologicallygrounded universal feature of the human mind.244 As philosopher Alasdair
“[n]arrative is a universal method of experiencing and sharing who we are”); FARZANA GOUNDER,
NARRATIVE AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 1 (2015) (discussing narrative
identity among several different language groups in the Pacific Islands).
239. See Elaine Reese, Ella Myftari, Helena M. McAnally, Yan Chen, Tia Neha, Qi Wang, Fiona
Jack & Sarah-Jane Robertson, Telling the Tale and Living Well: Adolescent Narrative Identity, Personality
Traits, and Well-Being Across Cultures, 88 CHILD DEV. 612, 612 (2017) (finding consistent patterns in
adolescent life-story development in New Zealand Maori, Chinese, and European cohorts); see also
Neşe Hatiboğlu & Tilmann Habermas, The Normativity of Life Scripts and Its Relation with Life Story
Events Across Culture and Subcultures, 24 MEMORY 1369, 1376–80 (2016) (discussing similarities in form
and differences in content of life stories across several cultures).
240. See Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Reverse-Engineering Narrative: Evidence of Special Design, in
THE LITERARY ANIMAL 177, 179–81 (Jonathan Gottschall & David Sloan Wilson eds., 2005) (“In my
own reading of the oral narrative of a wide range of foraging peoples, I have yet to encounter a culture
whose stories do not exhibit the same structural features as Western narrative.”). See generally PATRICK
COLM HOGAN, THE MIND AND ITS STORIES: NARRATIVE UNIVERSALS AND HUMAN EMOTION
(2003) (discussing “profound, extensive, and surprising universals in literature that are bound up with
universals of emotion”).
241. See, e.g., JONATHAN GOTTSCHALL, THE STORYTELLING ANIMAL: HOW STORIES MAKE
US HUMAN 30 (2012) (“The fact that story is a human universal is strong evidence of a biological
purpose.”).
242. See Morteza Dehghani, Reihane Boghrati, Kingson Man, Joe Hoover, Sarah I. Gimbel, Ashish
Vaswani, Jason D. Zevin, Mary Helen Immordino-Yang, Andrew S. Gordon, Antonio Damasio &
Jonas T. Kaplan, Decoding the Neural Representation of Story Across Languages, 38 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING
6096, 6096–106 (2017) (finding patterns of brain activation in telling and interpreting personal
anecdotes across English, Mandarin, and Farsi speaking populations).
243. See Dorthe Berntsen, Narrative Identity—Uniquely Human?, 3 EVOLUTIONARY STUD.
IMAGINATIVE CULTURE 27, 27 (2019).
244. See Dan P. McAdams, ‘First We Invented Stories, Then They Changed Us’: The Evolution of
Narrative Identity, 3 EVOLUTIONARY STUD. IMAGINATIVE CULTURE 1, 1 (2019) (“Storytelling would
appear to be an ingrained feature of human nature.”); PAUL COBLEY, NARRATIVE 1 (2014) (“[A]s the
latest research demonstrates, humans have a compulsion to narrate.”); Steven Pinker, Toward a
Consilient Study of Literature, 31 PHIL. & LIT. 162, 162 (2007) (“People tell stories.”); E.O. Wilson,
Forward from the Scientific Side, in THE LITERARY ANIMAL, supra note 240, at ix (“The mind is a
narrative machine.”); GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at 15 (“Humans are creatures of story, so story
touches nearly every aspect of our lives.”); see also BARBARA HARDY, TOWARD A POETICS OF
FICTION 5 (1968) (“In order really to live, we make up stories about ourselves and others, about the
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MacIntyre observed in 1984,245 and literary scholar Jonathan Gottschall
reiterated more recently, humans are storytelling animals.246
2. Life’s Stories and Meaning
The narrative theory of personal identity requires another step before we
may defensibly adopt it in law—the ethical claim that the narratives we form
matter and are worth protecting.247 Indeed, we could imagine a world in which
it were true that people naturally formed narratives—in the same way that we
naturally form tribes—without there being anything ethically significant about
this fact.248 If that were true, our life stories could not justify the significance
the doctrines of private law assume in the construct of personal identity.249 But
narrative is not merely any evolved quirk—bipedalism, bodily hairlessness, or
the lack of a baculum. It is, by its nature, of ethical significance. As such, it is a
worthy foundation for capacity, the gatekeeper of the private law.
Narrative is an essential vector of meaning-making in human life.250 To
tell a story is to forge from the raw material of reality’s happenings purpose,
intention, coherence, and morals.251 It is to find themes of universal significance
in particularities.252 Without story, the occurrences of the universe or human
personal as well as the social past and future.”); Fritz Heider & Marianne Simmel, An Experimental
Study of Apparent Behavior, 57 AM. J. PSYCH. 243, 251 (1944) (demonstrating the inclination of the
human mind to organize information into narrative form).
245. MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 216 (“[M]an is in his actions and practice, as well as in his
fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.”).
246. GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at xvii.
247. See Strawson, supra note 227, at 428 (“[T]he ethical Narrative thesis . . . states that experiencing
or conceiving of one’s life as a narrative is a good thing.”).
248. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN
NATURE 150 (2002) (discussing the “naturalistic fallacy” of reaching normative conclusions on the basis
of empirical claims).
249. See supra Section II.B.
250. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at 138 (“Story—sacred and profane—is perhaps the
main cohering force in human life.” (emphasis added)); see also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2274 (1989)
(describing narrative as a “basic cognitive impulse” to “make meaning in experience”); Robert M.
Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983) (“The very imposition of a
normative force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is the act of creating narrative.”).
251. See COBLEY, supra note 244, at 7 (“[A]s soon as we begin to think a little bit more deeply
about the issue, we might easily reach the conclusion that the whole storytelling impulse is illusory:
catching the bus, going out with friends, performing mundane tasks at work, watching football—none
of these stories come to fruition as stories unless we ‘choose’ to impose some kind of narrative form on
them.”); see also Cover, supra note 250, at 10 (“Narratives are models through which we study and
experience transformations that result when a given simplified state of affairs is made to pass through
the force field of a similarly simplified set of norms.”).
252. See GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at 55 (“No matter how far we travel back into literary
history, and no matter how deep we plunge into the jungles and badlands of world folklore, we always
find the same astonishing thing: their stories are just like ours.” (emphasis added)); see also RICOEUR,
supra note 22, at 66 (“These [temporal characteristics] allow us to call plot, by means of generalization,
a synthesis of the heterogeneous.”).
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affairs do not mean anything; it is only through the creative, the human, act of
story that they can come to mean.253 A factual, sequential description of a certain
collection of atoms at a certain time and place is meaningless; the story of the
rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte is one of ambition, triumph, hubris, folly,
love, betrayal.254 This is what the philosopher Paul Ricœur meant when he
wrote that “time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the
manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it
portrays the features of temporal experience,”255 a principle he found also in the
work of Augustine256 and Aristotle.257
If stories make meaning, it follows that life stories make lives
meaningful.258 As with any story, life stories turn the sequential happenings of
our experiences into a cohesive whole, a whole with themes, morals, and
purpose. And indeed, psychological research shows that people subjectively find
meaning in their life stories and in processing experiences through them.259 To
claim that humans make sense of their lives in narrative form, then, is not only
a descriptive claim about our biology. It is, not to put too fine a point on it,
necessarily a claim about the meaning of life.
With this observation in hand, we can return to the basic purposes of
private law. Private law exists to promote human flourishing through private
ordering.260 An essential part of our flourishing is our construction of identities
through the stories of our lives. Therefore, the private-law doctrine of capacity
ought to take account of those stories.

253. See COBLEY, supra note 244, at 7–8 (“A sequence of any kind might exist in the world, but if
that sequence is to consist of meaningful relations it requires human input; it needs to be understood
as being made up of signs.”); see also RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 65 (“In short, emplotment is the
operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession.”).
254. See generally ANDREW ROBERTS, NAPOLEON: A LIFE (2014) (describing the life of Napoleon
Bonaparte).
255. RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 3.
256. See id. at 5–30 (analyzing Augustine’s Confessions).
257. Id. at 31–51 (analyzing Aristotle’s Poetics).
258. See MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY, supra note 234, at 11 (“[T]hrough our personal
myths, each of us discovers what is true and what is meaningful in life.”); GOTTSCHALL, supra note
241, at 161 (“A life story is a ‘personal myth’ about who we are deep down—where we come from, how
we got this way, and what it all means.”).
259. See Odachowski et al., supra note 234, at 314 (“These results can be interpreted as a
manifestation of the healing function of self-story framing of a difficult life event.”); see also Dan P.
McAdams & Kate C. McLean, Narrative Identity, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 233, 233
(2013) (“Research into the relation between life stories and adaption shows that narrators who find
redemptive meanings in suffering and adversity, and who construct life stories that feature themes of
personal agency and exploration, tend to enjoy higher levels of mental health, well-being, and
maturity.”).
260. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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III. A NARRATIVE THEORY OF CAPACITY IN PRIVATE LAW
The current cognitive doctrine of capacity in private law is out of step with
its purposes. As such, it ought to be reformed to incorporate the ethical
significance of narrative personal identity by statute or adjudication. This part
outlines a new narrative doctrine of capacity. The doctrinal formulation would
be: “A decision that does not follow in a narrative structure from the story of
an individual’s life will not be recognized in law.” First, this part draws on
insights from psychology, literary theory, and philosophy to distill a test of
narrative. Next, it details the procedural rules that would govern the application
of the narrative test. Finally, it discusses the role cognitive testing would
continue to play in the new doctrine, properly situated to determine in extreme
cases that an individual cannot be the same person that they were because they
may not be a person at all.
A.

The Narrative Doctrine

A life story is a subjective construct.261 It is a fact about the way we
experience the world and our lives. We therefore cannot directly litigate whether
a particular decision follows from an individual’s subjective story.262 And
because there is ample psychological evidence that people embellish their stories
to render themselves the protagonist, there may be good reasons not to directly
embed subjective life stories in law.263 But life stories are the stuff of personal
identity, and as such, they should be the basis of the private-law doctrine of
capacity.264
A life story is objectively a story. In other words, regardless of their
contents in the minds of their possessors, life stories objectively follow the
structure of story in general; they have a narrative structure that can be
understood and characterized from a third-person perspective. Another way of
thinking about this is that implicit in the phenomenological claim of narrative
identity is a behavioral claim—we behave in ways that fit into a narrative
structure from our subjective life stories, which roughly cohere to the objective
stories others would tell about us.265 This we can litigate. With an objective
261. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 95.
262. Cf., e.g., State v. Belleville, 88 A.3d 918, 921 (N.H. 2014) (noting that in the criminal law
context, “a culpable mental state must . . . be proven by circumstantial evidence”).
263. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at 170 (“[W]e misremember the past in a way that
allows us to maintain protagonist status in the stories of our own lives.”).
264. This is so in much the same way that the cognitive doctrine of capacity is based in a cognitive
theory of personhood but is not identical to it. See supra Section II.A.3.
265. Moreover, as the coherence criterion below, infra Section III.A.5, and Marya Schechtman’s
understanding of narrative self-constitution makes clear, subjective stories that depart radically from
the objective story a third-party would tell about the individual are not entitled to moral concern and
may not even qualify as stories. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 119–20 (“A narrative that reveals
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definition of story, we can determine whether a particular decision follows as a
matter of narrative from the plausible stories of the life of the individual.
A story is an organizational mode that condenses temporally distinct
events about persons into an intelligible, coherent, and thematic chain of
causation. To break this understanding of narrative into its analytical
constituents, a decision would be recognized if it is (1) related to the past and
future of that individual’s life; and related in an (2) intentional; (3) intelligible;
and (4) coherent (5) causal chain that builds to a (6) theme.266 This section
discusses each element of narrative in turn.267
1. Temporality
Narratives take place across narrative time; there is no such thing as an
instantaneous story.268 As Ricœur wrote, narrative “implies memory.”269 This
suggests that, in order for a proposed decision to follow from a life story, it must
bear some relationship to prior events in the individual’s story and predicted or
hoped-for events of the future. For example, in Thrash, where the court
the narrator to be deeply out of touch with reality is thus undermining of personhood and cannot . . .
be identity-constituting.”).
266. Although this test will surely be most commonly applied to cases of narrative change (after all,
few people challenge decisions that aren’t some kind of change), it can be equally applicable in cases
where staying the same is questionably narrative—for example, if something dramatic has happened that
would ordinarily cause a change, but hasn’t.
267. In the interest of theoretical completeness, in addition to the foregoing six elements, stories
are creatures of language, and in order to have the qualifying narrative structure, a decision must be
expressible in language. See, e.g., James Paul Gee, A Linguistic Approach to Narrative, 1 J. NARRATIVE
& LIFE HIST. 15, 15 (1991) (analyzing the linguistic structure of narrative form); COBLEY, supra note
244, at 8, 34 (describing that in order to constitute a narrative, a sequence “needs to be understood as
being made up of signs,” and that “[w]hat is evident here is a view of the impulse to narrative
organization as fundamental to humans, a reflection of the minute processes, pairings, oppositions and
similarities, that make a language possible”); RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 54 (arguing that “temporality
is brought to language to the extent that language configures and refigures temporal experience”).
Indeed, it appears that the narrative structure of our minds arose coincident with the development of
language in the Pleistocene. See, e.g., Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Food, Foragers & Folklore: The Role of
Narrative in Human Subsistence, 22 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 223 (2001) [hereinafter Scalise
Sugiyama, Food, Foragers & Folklore] (“While it is impossible to pinpoint the birth of narrative, a
number of lines of evidence indicate that it emerged in the Pleistocene.”). It is, however, difficult to
imagine instances in which the theoretical requirement that a story need be expressible in language
would be outcome-dispositive in legal cases—after all, anything that could be expressed in a courtroom
could be expressed in language. For this reason, I do not include a separate criterion of linguistic
“expressibility” in the proposed test.
268. See, e.g., COBLEY, supra note 244, at 2 (describing narrative as “necessarily bound up with
sequence, space and time.”); see also Chantal M. Boucher & Alan Scoboria, Reappraising Past and Future
Transitional Events: The Effects of Mental Focus on Present Perceptions of Personal Impact and Self-Relevance,
83 J. PERSONALITY 361, 361 (2015) (“Despite these differences, mental simulations of both past and
future events can inform current thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in ways comparable to present
situations . . . , and they provide material upon which to construct a personal life narrative that
incorporates self-knowledge and personal goals.”).
269. RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 10.
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considered the capacity of an elderly man who had begun a new romantic
relationship, if Thrash proffered a decision that bore no relation to events in his
past, nor related to his imagined or anticipated future, the law need not
recognize it.
2. Causation
Narratives are not simply descriptions of temporally-situated sequences—
they are an organizational mode about causation.270 Indeed, it is for this essential
reason that the narrative doctrine is concerned with the causes of decisions, not
their substance. That is, “X happened. Later, Y happened”271 is a description of
sequential events, whereas “Y happened because of X” might be a story. At an
abstract level, if there were no causal explanation for a change, society need not
recognize it.272
More concretely, the causation criterion has two practical implications for
capacity litigation. First, it is important to remember that, although it must be
litigated with reference to external evidence, the ultimate goal of this test is to
assess the narrative structure of the individual decision maker’s life story—that
is, after all, what is constitutive of their personal identity.273 In litigating
whether the causation criterion is met, then, we must consider whether the
decision has a cause from the perspective of the individual; whether the decision
maker does (or could) see the decision as caused. This requirement can do a
great deal of work in distinguishing decisions the law must recognize from those
it need not. Everything, of course, is caused from some external perspective—a
decision entirely the result of dementia as much as a decision made for love, but
270. See COBLEY, supra note 244, at 5 (“‘Plot’ is the chain of causation which dictates that these
events are somehow linked and that they are therefore to be depicted in relation to each other.”);
RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 69 (describing “causal connection” as essential to narrative); MACINTYRE,
supra note 22, at 208 (describing narrative as a “causal and temporal order”); GOTTSCHALL, supra note
241, at 102 (describing “relationships of cause and effect” as a fundamental of narrative).
271. The exceptions that prove the rule here are statements like “Before he came down here, it
never snowed. And afterwards it did.” EDWARD SCISSORHANDS (20th Century Fox 1990). Such
statements are stories but are self-consciously structured as sequential descriptions. They are only
stories because their actual meaning differs from a context-independent reading of their language. After
all, what Kim was saying here in context was that it now snows because Edward is still alive and
heartbroken.
272. This may seem to vitiate the ubiquitous phrase of the contract law of employment (and
elsewhere) purporting to authorize decisions with “any or no reason.” See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Party
Experience, Inc., 233 A.D.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (describing an “at will” employee as one
that can be terminated for “any or no reason”). But obviously this was always a legal fiction—if the
decision was made by human beings, there is a story as to why it was made. See, e.g., Daniel Schwartz,
“For Any Reason or for No Reason”—The Language of an At-Will Employment Relationship, CONN.
EMP. L. BLOG (May 20, 2010), https://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2010/05/articles/for-anyreason-or-for-no-reason-the-language-of-an-at-will-employment-relationship/ [https://perma.cc/RJX7
-XA9D] (“[E]very action has a ‘reason.’” (emphasis added)). This is distinct from the extent to which
a party must explain the reason to the court, as discussed infra Section IV.B.1.
273. See supra Section III.A.
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only in the latter circumstances would the decision maker themselves see the
decision as caused, and it is only those decisions that the law must recognize.
Thus, if Thrash simply woke up one morning wanting to marry Laura, a
decision that he did not see as having a cause, the law would not recognize it.
If, however, he saw the decision as arising from his love for her, the law would
be obligated to recognize it.
Second, stories are causal sequences of events; the events of the story have
causal relationships among themselves.274 This aspect of the causation criterion
too may do real work in litigation. If the only explanation for Thrash’s decision
were a sequence of events unconnected by causal relationships among
themselves—specifically, a sequential series of exogenously caused, unrelated
events—the law should not acknowledge it.
3. Agency
There are three further qualifications about the nature of causation that
distinguish stories from general causal sequences. The first is that the kind of
causation found in narratives is intentional; stories are about persons who are
intentional agents, which we would ordinarily call characters.275 Some people
might describe “the ball rolled down the incline because of gravity” as a story,
but it wouldn’t be much of one.276 Stories are not about physical causes like the
fundamental forces, they are about the causal power of human intent, about
characters doing things. The causal structure of stories is mediated through the
agency concomitant with personhood, and stories are not deterministic.277 “The
atoms formed an ionic bond because of electrostatic attraction” is not a story;
“I insisted she get on the plane because I loved her” is.278 This qualification may
274. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., DAVID HERMAN, STORYTELLING AND THE SCIENCES OF THE MIND 31 (2013)
(describing “narrative modes of sense making” as entailing “person-oriented strategies for ‘storying the
world’”); see Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto, Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and
Narrative Practice, in THE SHARED MIND: PERSPECTIVES ON INTERSUBJECTIVITY 17, 27–28 (Jordan
Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha & Esa Ikonen eds., 2007) (“[M]aking explicit a person’s
narrative is the medium for understanding and evaluating reasons and making sense of actions.”);
RICOEUR, supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]ime becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the
manner of a narrative . . . .”); see also Dan P. McAdams, The Psychological Self as Actor, Agent, and Author,
8 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 272, 273 (2013) (“[T]he autobiographical author works to formulate a
meaningful narrative for life . . . why the actor does what it does, why the agent wants what it wants,
and who the self was, is, and will be.”).
276. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995)
(acknowledging that “[s]ome people might call” a group of people walking from here to there for no
reason “a parade, but it would not be much of one”).
277. See, e.g., Odachowski et al., supra note 234, at 296 (“A crucial building block of narrative is a
coincidence of intentions and complications, or the so-called story plot.”); HERMAN, supra note 275,
at 29 (noting that “ascriptions of intentions to persons” are inextricably linked with “storytelling
practices”).
278. See CASABLANCA, supra note 33.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2022)

2022]

NARRATIVE CAPACITY

1121

do a lot of practical work in cases involving dementia and mental illness. It tells
us that where the cause of a decision is not an intentional, human one, where
the cause is a degenerative disease, it is not entitled to respect. Where the story
is “our son was there for us when no one else was, and we want to reward him,”
the law should enforce the decision; where the dispositive causal apparatus is
degeneration caused by amyloid-β build-up (or whatever),279 it should not.
4. Intelligibility
Further, narrative causality must be intelligible. This criterion does not
require that the decision maker (or anyone else) actually understand the
causality. Instead, it is a criterion of intelligibility—the kind of causality must
be understandable and the place of the decision in the story comprehensible.280
This criterion, easily met in the mine-run of human decision-making, may also
do important work in litigated capacity cases. For example, many individuals
with dementia begin to make decisions that are not intelligible to them, unable
to understand why they are making the particular decision and how it relates to
their past and future.281 More importantly, some of these decisions are utterly
unintelligible—unintelligible to the individual making them and to any
observer. It is these decisions that don’t meet the intelligibility criterion and
the law would not recognize.
5. Coherence
Moreover, the causal sequence of a story is coherent, or a plausible account
of actual causation.282 The plausibility demanded by the coherence criterion is
279. See JASON KARLAWISH, THE PROBLEM OF ALZHEIMER’S: HOW SCIENCE, CULTURE, AND
POLITICS TURNED A RARE DISEASE INTO A CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 229 (2021)
(summarizing the growing recognition of heterogeneous etiologies of Alzheimer’s).
280. See, e.g., Emily Postan, Defining Ourselves, Personal Bioinformation as a Tool of Narrative SelfConception, 13 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 133, 136 (2016) (“[A]lthough it is not supposed or required that
we literally or perpetually relate our own self-stories, they must at least be relatable and intelligible to
ourselves and to others.”); Kenneth Baynes, Self, Narrative, and Self-Constitution, Revisiting Taylor’s SelfInterpreting Animals, 41 PHIL. F. 441, 449 (2010) (“What [is essential] to the narrativity thesis is . . .
locating one’s action in a script that ‘makes sense’ of one’s life (to oneself) at any given time.”);
MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 217 (“When someone complains—as do some of those who attempt or
commit suicide—that his or her life is meaningless, he or she is often and perhaps characteristically
complaining that the narrative of their life has become unintelligible to them.”).
281. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 147 (“Those who suffer from dementia are robbed of
precisely the ability to pull their lives together into a coherent story; they become terrified and confused
because they cannot put the pieces together.”).
282. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALL, supra note 241, at 102 (noting that our narrative self-conceptions
allow us to “experience our lives as coherent, orderly, and meaningful”); Kate C. McLean, Monisha
Pasupathi, William L. Dunlop, Robyn Fivush, Matthew E. Graci, Jennifer Lodi-Smith, Moin Syed,
Jonathan M. Adler, David Drustrup, Jennifer P. Lilgendahl, Dan P. McAdams & Tara P. McCoy, The
Empirical Structure of Narrative Identity: The Initial Big Three, 119 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 920,
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human plausibility. That is, in adjudicating whether a proffered cause is
coherent, we may rely on our basic understandings of human nature, and how
human causation works. King Lear’s all-too-human desire for flattery is
coherent and enforceable;283 the opposite claim “I want to give her my fortune
because she broke my heart” may not be.
To be clear, this coherence requirement is about plausibility, not truth. The
decision “I disinherited my daughter because she said a mean thing about me”
is enforceable even if, in fact, the decider only heard it that way.284 Thus, the
essential inquiry is whether the decision is a plausible, human response to
stimulus; if it would be, in other words, a plausible decision if we read a
character in a book making it. This substantive, narrative plausibility, then, is
importantly distinct from the facial plausibility ubiquitous in pleading
standards.285 The plausibility required by the coherence criterion is narrative
plausibility—whether the established facts form a coherent, plausible
narrative—not factual plausibility—whether the facts alleged in the complaint
happened at all.
6. Theme
Finally, stories are sequences of human causes with human themes.286
Indeed, Scalise Sugiyama has documented that all stories the world over are
about a handful of key themes including “birth/death, and a wide array of topics
that may be loosely categorized as ‘human social behavior’—for example, sex,
marriage, religion, proscriptions, deception, and violence.”287 The stories of
decision-making in the cases we are considering are about these things too—

939 (2019) (describing “chronological coherence” as a fundamental aspect of empirical data regarding
life stories); Baynes, supra note 280, at 457 (“[W]e defer to an agent’s self-descriptions unless the
account he or she gives strikes us as implausible.”).
283. See id.
284. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1.
285. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
286. See, e.g., McLean et al., supra note 282, at 928 (finding “theme,” described as “clarity of the
topic in the narrative” in an empirical study of the structure of life stories); Boucher & Scoboria, supra
note 268, at 363 (describing how narrative reasoning requires “focusing on how the event relates to life
themes, traits, and goals”); see also Cover, supra note 250, at 5 (“[E]very narrative is insistent in its
demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.”).
287. Scalise Sugiyama, Food, Foragers & Folklore, supra note 267, at 222; see also GOTTSCHALL,
supra note 241, at 56 (“[S]tories revolve around a handful of master themes. Stories universally focus
on the great predicaments of the human condition. Stories are about sex and love. They are about the
fear of death and the challenges of life.”).
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reconciliation or abuse,288 family or romantic love,289 assistance or alienation.290
This criterion may play a determinative role where the decision-making of an
individual with dementia or mental illness is so fractured that it fails to cohere
into a meaningful theme.
B.

Procedural Rules of the Narrative Doctrine

This section outlines two of the most significant procedural rules that
would govern the narrative doctrine of capacity. First, a strong presumption of
capacity, borrowed from the current doctrine, would deter frivolous litigation
and limit intrusions into privacy. Second, the narrative doctrine would retain a
liberal moral agnosticism to private decision-making of the current regime.
1. Presumption of Capacity
The current capacity paradigm relies on a strong presumption that adults
have capacity.291 This presumption would remain in force in a narrative
doctrine. Indeed, a presumption of the narrative consistency of a given decision
with a life story makes sense. After all, it is an empirical premise of the narrative
doctrine that people’s lives are structured as stories, and where they aren’t,
something has gone wrong.292 This means that if we were to litigate every
decision in the absence of a presumption, the vast majority of decisions would
follow from the individual’s life story. A strong presumption of capacity is
therefore empirically justified and would relieve the courts of the burden of
litigating every decision on the merits under the narrative standard.293 With this
presumption in place, then, there is no reason to expect an explosion of capacity
litigation nor reason to fear that findings of incapacity would become more
routine.294
Moreover, the prima facie burden placed on the party challenging
narrative coherence would also serve to protect the privacy of the decision
maker. There may be value to the decision maker (and those defending

288. See Wiesman v. Wiesman, No. 2017AP466, 2018 WL 4943805, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10,
2018) (unpublished table decision).
289. See In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *1 (Tex. Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2019).
290. See In re Estate of Marsh, No. 2010 CA 78, 2011 WL 5137235, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28,
2011).
291. See KOHN, supra note 14, at 153.
292. See supra Section II.C.1.
293. See, e.g., Joel S. Hjelmaas, Stepping Back from the Thicket: A Proposal for the Treatment of
Rebuttable Presumptions and Inferences, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 434 (1993) (“The cornerstone for many
rebuttable presumptions is probability.”).
294. See, e.g., Alexander H. Cote, Trial of Error: The Omission of Elements in Jury Instructions Requires
Automatic Reversal on Habeas Review, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 403, 415 n.66 (2000) (noting that procedural
presumptions can discourage frivolous litigation).
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narrative coherence) in not explaining the story of the decision in open court.295
The presumption would ensure that that privacy interest would not be intruded
upon unless the contesting party comes forward with a plausible account for
why the decision did not make narrative sense.296 Where the presumption is
prima facie overcome, the case may proceed under pseudonyms or seal, or
pursuant to protective orders, as necessary to protect the individual’s privacy.297
Of course, there may be situations in which, to obtain legal recognition of a
decision, the decision maker may have to explain the story in open court. But
the current doctrine of capacity already “reveal[s] to complete strangers some
of the most intimate and personal details of a person’s life,” including facts
about their medical status.298 Therefore, with the presumption of capacity—and
other procedural mechanisms at the court’s disposal—the narrative doctrine
would not be substantially more invasive than the cognitive one.
2. Moral Agnosticism to Private Decision-Making
Finally, as discussed above,299 one of the benefits of the contemporary
doctrine of capacity is that it is agnostic to the content of individual decisionmaking. This principle is important because liberal governments ought to be
agnostic to individual ethical choices.300 It is true that, applying the narrative
standard, courts must look to the content of the decision to determine whether
it follows from the story of the individual’s life. But the narrative standard is
morally agnostic to the content of the story. Indeed, the only question before
the court would be whether the decision follows in a narrative way from the
story of the individual’s life, not whether the story the decision helps build is a
morally inspiring one. Michael Corleone’s descent into evil is as much a story
as Jaime Lannister’s redemption.301 Thus, the court would have no greater role

295. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (noting that privacy rights are implicated
in personal decision-making).
296. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”).
297. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (permitting federal courts to issue protective orders “to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”);
see also George K. Walker, Family Law Arbitration: Legislation & Trends, J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 521,
560 (2008) (noting that “family law counsel may be familiar with cases where there are closed
hearings . . . and sealed records”).
298. See, e.g., Daniel J. Reiter, Public Access to Guardianship Cases: A World of Inconsistency, ADULT
GUARDIANSHIP L. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.adultguardianshiplawblog.com/2020/12/
public-access-to-adult-guardianship-cases-a-world-of-inconsistency/ [https://perma.cc/2JGJ-D8ER].
299. See supra Section I.C.
300. See generally RAWLS, supra note 149 (articulating seminal thoughts on political liberalism).
301. Compare THE GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount Pictures 1974), with GEORGE R.R.
MARTIN, A FEAST FOR CROWS (2005).
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in adjudicating the wisdom or desirability of decisions than it currently does; its
review is limited to narrative structural coherence.302
For example, in In re Farr,303 where the decedent disinherited his
granddaughters because of disagreements with their mother,304 the court may
well feel that it would have been a better story, and perhaps Farr a better man,
if he had come to forgive his granddaughters the perceived indiscretions of their
birth. But his disinheriting them was a story, and the decision had a narrative
relationship with his life story. As such, under the narrative doctrine, the court
would recognize the decision, regardless of its opinions on whether Farr’s story
was one to emulate.
Moreover, as described above, it is an essential attribute of stories that
they be about human agency as a medium of causation; they must not be
deterministic. In every case, then, there will have been a range of decisions that
the individual could have made, all of which would have followed from the story
of their life. It is not the court’s role to determine whether the decision was the
best available, nor whether the story would have been better in some aesthetic
or moral sense if the individual had chosen otherwise. The court is simply to
determine whether the decision fell within the range of narrative plausibility.
Thus, like the current doctrine, the narrative doctrine is morally agnostic to the
content of decisions.305
C.

Cognitive Assessments, Baseline Personhood, and the Narrative Doctrine

Cognitive assessment of contemporaneous mechanical functioning would
continue to play an important, if tightly cabined, role under the narrative
doctrine of capacity. The narrative doctrine is based on the premise that what
matters to decisions recognized by private law is personal identity, not
personhood. Although these constructs are distinct, they are not unrelated.
Indeed, as mentioned above, to be the same person one was, one must, at a
minimum, be a person.306 Personhood is a necessary but not sufficient condition
of personal identity. Thus, medical testimony indicating an extreme level of
cognitive deterioration, such that it is impossible for the individual to be the
same person that they had been because they are not a person at all, is sufficient
to preclude the individual from making a valid decision. Similarly, in extreme
cases of lifelong mental illness, a cognitive test based in the philosophy of

302. The possibility of the sub silentio introduction of judges’ substantive moral views is discussed
infra Section IV.B.4.
303. 49 P.3d 415 (Kan. 2002).
304. Id. at 420–21.
305. Of course, it is always possible for facially liberal legal standards to be applied in illiberal ways
by biased judges or juries. This possibility is discussed infra Section IV.B.4.
306. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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personhood could serve as a backstop to access private law.307 In some cases,
then, cognitive evidence could offer the most efficient resolution.
Indeed, the cognitive paradigm has always made the most sense—and
always been most clearly justified—at the extremes.308 Everyone agrees that
healthy adults ought to be generally entitled to legal recognition of their
decisions.309 And it is similarly agreed that after a substantial amount of
cognitive decline, people should not be permitted to upset their lives and
finances.310 In these cases at the extremes, the cognitive test has always gotten
the right answer—permitting healthy adults to make decisions and not
recognizing decisions made in extreme cases of cognitive deviation. But it does
so for the wrong reasons—tying the conclusion to personhood rather than
personal identity. From this perspective, the problem with the cognitive theory
is that it is a crude approximation of the personal identity that matters, not that
cognitive testing has no role where it has been reaching the right answers.
If personhood is logically necessary but not sufficient for personal identity,
it may seem that the narrative doctrine could only do work in preventing an
additional class of people from making decisions—those who remain
philosophical persons but who have lost personal identity—rather than
recognizing decisions that the current system does not. If this were right, the
doctrinal intervention proposed in this Article might be objectionable for other
reasons—disproportionately disadvantaging older people as a class, for
instance311—and would seem inconsistent with the intuition that, in at least
some cases (perhaps like Thrash), courts have been too cavalier in refusing to
recognize decisions rather than the other way around. If the current cognitive
threshold of decision-making capacity were a precise and accurate measure of
personhood, it would be true that focusing the doctrine on personal identity
would necessarily strip decision-making rights from more people.
But, as discussed above, the current cognitive threshold of capacity in
private law is not a precise and accurate measure of personhood; it is grounded in
the same variables as personhood.312 Indeed, it is plausible that the reason the
doctrine of capacity sets a higher threshold than the theories of personhood on
which it is based is the intuition that a relatively weak requirement of
personhood is insufficient to prevent a class of decisions we want to prevent—
307. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 22, at 118 (“[W]idespread or serious failure to be able to
explicate one’s narrative can be seen to compromise the overall degree of personhood.”).
308. Arias, supra note 45, at 137.
309. See Williston, supra note 219, at 366–68.
310. See generally Toomey, Perspectives of Seniors, supra note 29 (finding widespread agreement that
there is a point during the development of dementia that individuals should be precluded from making
some decisions).
311. But see Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding that older
persons are not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause).
312. See supra Section II.A.3.
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those made with person-levels of cognition but which disrupt a life story.313 But
instead of analyzing that intuition and realizing that it arises from the fact that
what matters is personal identity, the doctrine may have simply raised the
thresholds on the variables pertinent to personhood. This would explain why
the doctrine—correct in the extremes—has struggled so much in the close cases.
It is a crude instrument that, by virtue of its conceptual disconnect, necessarily
fails to properly distinguish beyond the minimal threshold of personhood.
In sum, the narrative reformulation of the doctrine would properly situate
cognitive personhood where it belongs—establishing in extreme cases that
individuals with a certain global lack of cognitive functioning cease to be
entitled to the highest moral concern. Under the new doctrine, the narrative
theory of personal identity would do the distinguishing work past the minimal
threshold of personhood.
IV. THE NARRATIVE DOCTRINE APPLIED
With its emphasis on the apparently ephemeral construct of life story, the
narrative doctrine may appear costly, complicated, and difficult to litigate. It
may also appear that the cognitive doctrine is a close enough approximation of
what matters to justify not upsetting the current paradigm. Not so. Indeed, the
narrative doctrine corrects two kinds of errors endemic to the cognitive test.
Moreover, the narrative standard is determinate, litigable, and mitigates many
of the practical difficulties associated with capacity litigation.
A.

Resolving the Hard Cases

As discussed above, the cognitive doctrine of capacity has always been
most successful in extreme cases but struggles in the gray area where an
individual has lost some cognitive functions but retains others.314 In contrast,
the narrative standard directs courts to hone precisely in on the facts that
distinguish decisions that should be respected from those that should not be. In
so doing, it solves two kinds of errors that the cognitive doctrine necessarily
commits.
1. Decisions Made with Above-Threshold Cognitive Functioning That Do
Not Follow from the Decision Maker’s Story
The first kind of error made by the cognitive doctrine is in recognizing
decisions that do not follow in a narrative way from a life story but are made
with cognitive functioning above the threshold. In these situations, courts are
complicit with a disease in upsetting the life story of an individual and possibly
313. See Toomey, Perspectives of Seniors, supra note 29, at 106 (finding broad support for
intervention where decision-making disrupts personal identity).
314. Arias, supra note 45, at 137.
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facilitating others in taking advantage of the situation.315 This may well have
been what happened in Marsh.316 Applying the cognitive doctrine, the court
enforced Clara Marsh’s decision to cut her daughter out of her will.317 The court
did not resolve the factual questions necessary for determining whether, in fact,
Marsh really wanted to exclude her daughter for a narrative reason, or whether
her disposition was the causal result of Alzheimer’s paranoia.318
Under the narrative doctrine, rather than focusing solely on medical
reports of Marsh’s dementia as it did, the court would have asked whether
Marsh’s decision to disinherit her daughter followed in a narrative structure
from the story of Clara Marsh. It would have asked whether the decision (1)
related to events in her past and future in an (2) intentional, (3) intelligible,
and (4) coherent (5) causal structure, with a (6) theme. Here, the temporal
relationship, causality, agency, and intelligibility requirements are met
(“[b]ecause of all the legal problems”),319 and the thematic requirement may be
met.
Fundamentally at issue in this case, as it often would be under the
narrative standard, was whether Clara Marsh’s decision was coherent. This turns
on the narrative facts discussed throughout this Article. To know if it was
coherent, the factfinder must determine whether the decision was a plausible
account of human causation. This turns on a broad corpus of facts about Marsh
and her relationships with her children. If, for example, the court found that
Marsh and her daughter had recently had a conversation about the necessity of
guardianship, agreed to it; nothing changed; and she hadn’t spoken to her son
in years, then her decision was incoherent. It simply would not be a plausible,
coherent account of causation. On the other hand, if the court found that Marsh
had told her daughter for other, narrative reasons that she wanted to leave
everything to her son, and the daughter turned around and petitioned for
guardianship, Marsh’s decision would be coherent. Thus, adjudicating the
coherence criterion, and, thereby analyzing whether the court reached the right
outcome, would require access to a broader body of facts than the court found,
such as testimony from friends and family.
2. Decisions Made with Under-Threshold Cognitive Functioning That
Follow from the Decision Maker’s Story
On the other hand, courts routinely commit errors in refusing to recognize
decisions. As discussed above, the capacity doctrine demands greater cognitive
315.
316.
2011).
317.
318.
319.

See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 101, at 230.
In re Estate of Marsh, No. 2010 CA 78, 2011 WL 5137235, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28,
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1, *11.
Id.
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functioning than personhood.320 This necessarily means that courts are denying
basic rights to a class of persons, who, in many instances, are the same persons
they always have been.321
This is quite plausibly what happened in Thrash—where an elderly
mechanic moved in with a new lover. Indeed, it’s possible that Thrash’s
purchase of the home met each requirement of the narrative standard. Surely it
related to his past views on living in a big house and to his future hope to live
in one. If indeed it was a change of heart brought about by his new love for
Laura, it is hard to think of a more intentional, intelligible, and coherent cause.
This story is thematic, about a closed-off bachelor finding love. In short, if a
new and genuine love for Laura induced the behavioral changes, the court ought
not to have found Thrash incapacitated. Given the extent to which it seems all
parties agreed that Thrash loved Laura,322 it is possible that the court did a
profoundly wrong thing, denying him the personal right to make decisions
recognized by private law.323
In sum, the narrative doctrine of capacity resolves respective errors of
over- and underinclusion in the gray area above the threshold of personhood
where the current doctrine struggles.
3. The Problem of Differing Lifelong Cognitive Functioning
Finally, the narrative standard resolves the atheoretical disparity of the
current doctrine’s differential treatment of those with different lifelong
cognitive functioning.324 As discussed above, because the cognitive doctrine
applies the same threshold to those with differing lifelong cognitive abilities,
those with higher adult-baseline functioning will need to change more before
the law intervenes than those with lower baseline functioning.325 This can be
understood as harming both higher- and lower-functioning individuals in
different ways. Those with higher lifelong functioning are permitted to disrupt
the stories of their lives more before the courts can stop them. On the other
hand, those with lower lifelong functioning see the courts stepping into their
decision-making sooner, even if their choices follow coherently from their life
story.
The narrative doctrine of capacity does not suffer this incoherence. Both
individuals who are high and low functioning—and everyone in between—have
320. See supra Section II.A.3.
321. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 12, at 37 (“[H]aving the legal right to make . . . decisions removed
would be a fundamental intrusion on our civil liberties.”).
322. In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 2019).
323. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the person.”).
324. See supra Section I.B.2.
325. See supra Section I.B.2.
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the law intervene in their decision-making at the same point relative to their
life story—when they begin making decisions that disrupt it. In this way, the
narrative doctrine resolves this long-simmering theoretical challenge of—and
bizarre practical inequity within—the doctrine of capacity.
B.

Practical Considerations

Adopting the narrative doctrine of capacity by statute or adjudication
would be a substantial change. This raises many practical concerns. But as this
section argues, the narrative theory of capacity is not only normatively desirable
but practically workable. First, psychological expertise could help in refining
and adjudicating the narrative test. Second, by expanding the range of evidence
courts consider, the narrative test mitigates the evidentiary challenge that in
many capacity cases the best source of evidence—the decision maker—is dead.
Moreover, this wider range of evidence is more accessible to ordinary litigants.
Finally, although judicial bias is always a concern, the narrative test forces
potential bias into the open and subjects it to substantial appellate review, where
bias under the cognitive test is effectively unreviewable.
1. The Determinacy of the Narrative Test
In adjudicating whether a decision follows from an individual’s life story,
factfinders need not go at it alone. Indeed, recent research in psychology has
successfully studied life stories empirically and laid out a framework of
“common language” to analyze and assess their strength.326 In a recent study,
involving a large set of samples, researchers assessed the coherence of life stories
with a measure that was found to have an inter-rater reliability (measured by
intra-class correlation (“ICC”) a common measure of reliability327) of 0.90–0.95
across data sets.328 In contrast, the two most common cognitive batteries
currently used to screen for capacity in dementia patients, the Mini-Mental
State Examination and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, have ICCs of
approximately 0.75 and 0.81, respectively.329 In other words, it is plausible that
devising a psychological test for the coherence of a decision with an individual’s
life story could be more empirically reliable than current cognitive testing.
326. See McLean et al., supra note 282, at 941.
327. See, e.g., Shraddha Mehta, Rowena F. Bastero-Caballero, Yijun Sun, Ray Zhu, Diane K.
Murphy, Bhushan Hardas & Gary Koch, Performance of Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) as a
Reliability Index Under Various Distributions in Scale Reliability Studies, 37 STATS. MED. 2734, 2734
(2018).
328. McLean et al., supra note 282, at 928.
329. See Feeney et al., supra note 66, at 1107 (“MoCA (ICC=0.81) was more reliable than MMSE
(ICC=0.75), but all tests examined showed substantial within-patient variation.”); see also Moye et al.,
supra note 15, at 165 (“[C]linicians arrive at significantly discrepant judgments of capacity in dementia,
focusing on different cognitive and decisional abilities in patients, or holding values different from
those of patients.”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2022)

2022]

NARRATIVE CAPACITY

1131

2. Mitigating the “Worst Evidence” Problem
It is true that, as with any doctrine commonly raised in trusts and estates
litigation, the narrative doctrine would often run into what Professor John
Langbein has called the “worst evidence” problem—by the time these questions
are litigated, the person best situated to tell us the dispositive information, the
person whose life story it is we are trying to discern, is often dead.330 To some
extent the worst evidence problem is an irreducible challenge of American estate
law.331 But by expanding the corpus of relevant evidence and moving the
dispositive focus out from a momentary medical question, the narrative theory
of capacity mitigates rather than exacerbates the problem. Under the cognitive
paradigm, the dispositive question is the individual’s mental state at the time,
and generally, evidence is only admissible to the extent it goes to answering that
question.332 Thus, if the decedent was not medically tested for capacity, there is
no evidentiary alternative of comparable weight,333 and if the contemporaneous
medical evidence is inconclusive, courts often find themselves ignoring the
black-letter law and reaching for narrative facts anyway.334
In contrast, the dispositive question under the narrative paradigm is
broader, and the corpus of relevant evidence similarly so. More people,
presumably, have friends and family that can testify about the story of a decision
than have been medically tested for capacity. Such testimony is not perfect, and
it is, of course, possible for family and friends to profoundly misinterpret a
person’s story. But factfinders would have more evidence to draw upon in
adjudicating capacity under the narrative doctrine than the cognitive one.
3. Accessibility of Narrative Evidence
Although the fact that the narrative doctrine of capacity looks to a broader
corpus of evidence than the cognitive doctrine may suggest that litigating cases
would be more expensive and time-consuming, that is not necessarily so.
Medical capacity evaluations are themselves expensive and many older adults
of questionable cognitive abilities do not realistically have access to them.335 As
we saw earlier in Thrash, Laura’s failure to put forth medical testimony about
Thrash’s cognitive capacity—which could have been a result of her access to
testing just as much as her being worried about its likely conclusions—played a
330. See, e.g., Langbein, Will Contests, supra note 7, at 2044.
331. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 643, 647 (2014); see also Mark Glover, Restraining Live Hand Control of Inheritance, 79 MD. L. REV.
325, 367–68 (2020) (“Because probate occurs after the donor’s death, the best evidence of the donor’s
intent is unavailable, as the donor cannot simply appear in court and testify regarding what they
intended.”).
332. See In re Estate of Flowers, 88 N.E.3d 599, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
333. See In re Estate of Giaquinto, 164 A.D.3d 1527, 1529 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
334. See In re Estate of Farr, 49 P.3d 415, 426–29 (Kan. 2002).
335. See Perry et al., supra note 68, at 16.
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key role in motivating the court to rule against her.336 In contrast, testimony
from family and friends—the essential stuff of litigation under a narrative
theory—is cheap and accessible. While it is possible, then, that the narrative
doctrine would increase the amount of time spent in court, it is not at all clear
that it would increase the overall expense and time spent by the legal and
medical system in assessing decision-making capacity.
4. Judicial Bias and Appellate Review
Finally, there is a legitimate concern that introducing a standard that is
apparently less empirical and does not consider a single kind of fact dispositive
would introduce opportunities for judicial bias veiled by discretion.337 It is
certainly possible that some judges would, purposefully or implicitly, use the
narrative standard to render judgments on their views of the substantive ethics
of privately-made decisions.338 Indeed, in the early-twentieth-century cases, this
sometimes happened.339 And although courts at the time strove to avoid it and
were largely successful,340 it is impossible to expect judges, even those acting in
good faith, to entirely purge their substantive ethical views at the bench.
Nevertheless, and in contrast to the older cases, courts applying the
narrative doctrine outlined here would have a clear and determinate sense of
what they ought to be looking for—a theory of personal identity and a litigable
standard derived from it. Indeed, the determinacy of the six-element test
outlined above341 distinguishes the narrative doctrine of capacity from highly
criticized multi-factor balancing tests characteristic of family law doctrines, such
as the best interests of the child.342 Though we continue to trust courts with
such discretionary equitable standards, scholars have condemned these
336. See In re Guardianship of Thrash, No. 04-19-00104-CV, 2019 WL 6499225, at *8 (Tex. Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2019).
337. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
137, 161 (2013) (noting that “judicial discretion” in “family court” may raise opportunities for bias); see
also Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10B-5: Empirical Analysis and
Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 441, 509 (2012) (describing “excessive judicial
discretion” as “a recipe for bias”).
338. See, e.g., Mark B. Baer, The Amplification of Bias in Family Law and Its Impact, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 305, 328 (2020) (“The judge’s job involves making factual findings when the facts are in
dispute, and interpreting and applying the law, which includes exercising judicial discretion. All of the
biases that can impact an expert’s opinion apply equally well to judges.”).
339. See, e.g., Hamon v. Hamon, 79 S.W. 422, 426 (Mo. 1904).
340. See Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will, supra note 147, at 1028 (“Judges then took a third
and perhaps unnecessary step: summoning evidence to show that the will was, in fact, a perfectly
reasonable disposition—if not from the view of the jury or bench, then at least in the testator’s own
mind.”).
341. See supra Section III.A.
342. See, e.g., Vidrine v. Vidrine, 245 So. 3d 1266, 1277 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (“In determining the
best interest of a child, courts must consider . . . twelve factors set forth in [the statute]. However,
these factors are illustrative, not exclusive.”).
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doctrines for the extent to which judges rely on personal moral views in
applying them.343
More importantly, the cognitive capacity doctrine, notwithstanding its
apparent empiricism, is similarly open to judicial discretion and concomitant
bias. In so many of these cases, the court is offered conflicting medical
testimony from doctors of apparent good faith and strong qualifications. Courts
simply decide between them. They often say they are picking the doctor with
stronger qualifications or whose testimony was more convincing,344 and a claim
like this is particularly shielded from appellate review.345 There is, indeed,
strong evidence that judges’ biases have long played a role in finding incapacity
under the purportedly empirical cognitive doctrine.346 At least under the
narrative standard, any biases would be brought into plain view of an appellate
court—the appellate court would have before it a complete record of the facts
of the case, the characters at play, and the story of the individual. With these
narrative tools at its disposal, a reviewing court could see bias in the trial court’s
story-making just as we can see it where it occurred in the older cases.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and courts have long recognized that the threshold doctrine of
capacity in private law requires reform to meet the needs of our aging society.
What they have not clearly seen is the doctrine’s fundamental error—a
philosophical misalignment between the legal test, based on the construct of
personhood, and its purposes, which are concerned with personal identity. This
Article has excavated this distinction. And it has articulated and evaluated an
alternative.
We think of ourselves as stories and we make meaning of our lives through
our stories. That is what is at stake in the doctrine of capacity—whether an
individual may continue to write their story by making decisions and choices.
Concern for the stories of our lives should be a paramount guiding principle of
the capacity doctrine. In short, courts should only intervene in our decisionmaking where the story we would tell with our choices ceases to be our story at
all.

343. See, e.g., Sean Hannon Williams, Sex in the City, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1114–19 (2016)
(summarizing the indeterminacy of the “best interests of the child standard” and scholarly criticism).
344. Wiesman v. Wiesman, No. 2017AP466, 2018 WL 4943805, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10,
2018) (unpublished table decision).
345. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (providing that appellate courts owe “due regard” to the
opportunity of the trial court judge to assess the credibility of witnesses).
346. See, e.g., Annick Persinger, Still Pioneers: Special Social and Economic Hardships for Elderly Gays
and Lesbians, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 148–55 (2010) (discussing the history of courts finding
a lack of testamentary capacity and ignoring the wishes of gay individuals to leave property to their
same-sex partners).
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